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In broad terms, a product seller's obligations to purchasers
and product users are discharged by its introduction into
commerce of a duly safe product.' If warnings or instructions for
judicious use are necessary for the product to be used with no more
than a reasonable degree of risk, then the failure to provide such
2
warnings or instructions renders the product defective. In a
limited number of settings, however, a seller's warnings or
instructions obligations will survive the product's initial sale.3 The

t

Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
(THIRD)OF TORTS:P R O D ULIABlL1n
~
§ 1 cmt. a (1997)
1 . RESTATEMENT
(defining "Liability of Commercial Sellers Based on Product Defect at Time of
Sale"); see also id. at § 2 (setting forth the categories for when a product is defective
at the time of sale). Other non-seller participants in the distribution of a product
may be treated as sellers for the purposes of informational obligations. For the
most part, these departures from the orthodox application of products liability to
sellers alone occurs when the participant undertakes activities ordinarily associated
with the activities of sellers. An example of such a non-seller that often is treated
as a seller for the purposes of products liability might be a commercial automobile
lessor.
2. Id. at § 2(c).
3. See generally AM. LAW PROD.LIAB. 3d fj 79 ("Post-Sale or Continuing Duty
to Warn").
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presence or absence of a duty in tort, including a post-sale duty to
provide warnings or instructions, is usually decided by the trial
court as a matter of law.4
The decisional law suggests that post-sale (often also described
as "continuing") advisory duties may arise in four circumstances. In
the first, a seller may be obligated to warn consumers of a latent
defective and unreasonably dangerous condition associated with
the product that was unknown at the time of initial sale, but which
is the position taken by the majority
was discovered after sale."his
of courts that recognize such a duty in the first place.F An
alternative tack is that taken by the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability section 10, which states a rule that irrespective of
whether there exists a latent point-of-sale defect, a post-sale
advisory obligation may be imposed when "a reasonable person in
the seller's position would provide such a warning."'
A third position recognizes a post-sale warning obligation
4. E.g., Wilson v. United States Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1998)(affirming summary judgment in elevator accident claim, finding
manufacturer of elevator had no continuing duty to notify known p~~rchasers
of
technological advancements in door-closing mechanisms). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)
OFTORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABlLIn § 10 cmt. a (1997):
As with all rules that raise the question whether a duty exists, courts must
make the threshold decisions that, in particular cases, triers of fact could
reasonably find that product sellers can practically and effectively
discharge such an obligation and that the risks of harm are sufficiently
great tojustify what is typically a substantial post-sale undertaking. . . . In
light of the serious potential for overburdening sellers in this regard, the
court should carefully examine the circumstances for and against
imposing a duty to provide a postsale warning in a particular case.
5. Canto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Mass. 1975) (imposing postsale duty to warn of latent design defect "to eliminate the risk created by the
manufacturer's initial fault"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 3 10 cmt. a (1997) (stating "[clourts recognize that warnings about risks
discovered after sale are sometimes necessary to prevent significant harm to
persons and property."); see generally Michael L. Matula, Manufacturer's Post-Sale
Obligations i n tile 19901s,32 TORT& INS. L.J., 87-88 (1996). E.g., Vasallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). In Vmallo the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, "abrogating" prior precedent, wrote: "A manufacturer will
be held to the standard of knowledge of an expert in the appropriate field, and
will remain subject to a continuing duty to warn, a t least purchasers, of risks
discovered following the sale of the product at issue." Id. at 923.
6. Znfra Part 11.
7. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 10(a) (1997). Id.
at § 10 cmt. a ("Judicial recognition of the seller's duty to warn of a productrelated risk after the time of sale, whether o r not the product is defective at the
time of original sale within the meaning of other Sections of this Restatement, is
relatively new.").
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when a seller learns or should have learned of significant hazards
associated with product misuse or alteration. Be the misuse or
modification of the product caused by the user or by third parties,
if it renders the foreseeable use of the product unreasonably
unsafe, at least one influential court has held that the seller may be
required to advise purchasers even in circumstances where the
misuse or alteration might provide the seller a successful defense in
a design defect claim.'
The fourth approach, which a few courts have evaluated either
independently or in conjunction with one or more of the positions
stated above, focuses upon the relationship between the seller and
the vendee, or as appropriate, users or consumers. Some courts
adopting this approach propose that a post-sale duty will be
appropriate only when, following the initial sale, the seller has
commenced or continued activities, ranging from continued
servicing of like products to undertaking safety-related research,
sufficient to induce the purchaser or the user to reasonably expect
the seller's duty to disseminate hazard information to continue.
Along similar logic, some claimants have alleged that a post-sale
failure to warn constitutes actionable negligence pursuant to the
common law doctrine of "negligent undertaking.""
In contrast to the substantial minority ofjurisdictions that have
recognized one or another rationales for a continuing
informational obligation, a far more restrictive approach prevails
regarding claims that the seller should have recalled, retrofitted, or
otherwise acted to remedy an unreasonable product hazard. When
such a claim is posed by a plaintiff, it is often paired with an
allegation that the seller also breached a continuing warning
obligation. The profile of such claims fall into two broad categories.
In the first category, plaintiff alleges that there exists a post-sale
duty to recall or otherwise endeavor proactively to remedy a
product flaw upon the seller's post-sale discovery of unreasonable
risks not known to it at the time of initial sale. The second category
of such claims arises when post-sale advancements in technology
might permit or have permitted introduction and sale of an
-

--

-

8. See generally Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998). The
plaintiff in Lin'uno, a teenaged grocery store employee, suffered amputation of his
right hand and lower forearm while using defendant's commercial meat grinder,
from which the safety guard had been removed. Id. at 305.
9. See generally Artiglio v. Corning Inc., 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998)(claim
brought by recipients of silicone breast implants).
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alternatively-designed and safer product.'0
Courts and legislatures have generally declined to impose such
latter obligations, even in jurisdictions recognizing one or another
form of continuing warning obligation. A frequently stated
rationale for resisting calls for post-sale recall or repair duties has
been the high costs associated with recalls and retrofitting.
Accordingly, there is virtual unanimity that such a duty will
ordinarily only be triggered in two limited circumstances. The first
is when such action is required by statute, regulation or
governmental order, and the seller has failed to execute such an
11
obligation.
The second is when, even absent a governmentally
imposed obligation, the seller has "undertak[en] to recall the
product[,]" and has failed to perform this undertaking as would a
12
reasonable man.
Products Liability Restatement section 11
proposes recognition of these two limited exceptions, and none
other, to a broader "no duty" rule for recall and similar asserted
obligations.

In a quite significant expansion of the law of seller warning
and instructions duties, a growing number of jurisdictions now
recognize one or another post-sale or continuing seller
informational duties. As with warnings duties generally, when a
post-sale warning obligation is imposed, the question of to whom
the warning should be given will turn upon the facts of a particular
case, and will contemplate evaluation of the risks involved, the
efficacy and feasibility of one warning strategy over another, and
the likelihood that any warning will be conveyed to the users of the
product or those vulnerable to injury or loss due to the product's
IS
unsafe condition.
State by state authority as to the
10. See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABILITY§ 11
(1997) ("Liability of Commercial Product Seller o r Distributor for Harm Caused
by Post-Sale Failure to Recall Product"); see also id. at § ll(Reportst Note (a))
(collecting authority).
11. Id. at § 11(a) (1) (1997) (proposing liability for harm when the seller fails
to recall a product if "a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or
administrative regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to recall the
product").
12. Z d . a t § 1 1 ( 2 ) ( a ) ( l ) , ( 2 ) .
13. Seegenerally Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992) (stating
"[tlhe responsibility to warn of known defects cannot be satisfied merely by
alerting participating service centers. Because of the likelihood that a purchaser
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appropriateness of such duties remains split, with a substantial
number of jurisdictions finding or predicting that no such general
obligation should be imposed absent a showing of a point-of-sale
defect.I4 Still other jurisdictions have reached no decisions on the
matter.
Evaluation of the efficacy or adequacy of any post-sale warning
is similar, but not identical to that pertaining to point-of-sale
warnings. As with point-of-sale warnings, the seller's duty is owed
generally to foreseeable product users or to intermediaries who can
15
reasonably be expected to pass on the warning. However, a quite
particularized and polycentric evaluation may ensue in weighing
the need for and the anticipated efficacy of a post sale warning.
Read in the aggregate, the decisional law suggests that this
evaluation of nature of the warning and to whom it should be given
are guided properly by evaluation of the harm that may follow from
use of the product without an advisory from the seller; the
reliability of any intermediary who may be enlisted to convey the
warnings to the current user; the burden on the vendor or
manufacturer in locating the persons to be warned; the attention
that a notice of the type contemplated would likely receive from
the recipient; the nature of the product involved; and the
corrective actions, if any, taken by the seller in addition to the
16
post-sale warning.
will have a product serviced by its own technicians or by an ~ n ~ l i a t service
ed
center ...sellers must take reasonable steps to warn the user or consumer
directly."); see also Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864,872 (N.Y. 1984) (commenting
that the "nature of the warning to be given and to whom it should be given
likewise turn upon a number of factors, including the harm which may
result. . . .").
14. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABILITY§ 10 (Reporters'
Note (a)) (citing, among other decisions, Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d 518 (7th
Cir. 1996) (Illinois law imposes no general continuing duty to warn)); Romero v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law);
Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589 N.E.2d 569, 579 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991); Syrie v.
Knoll Int'l, 748 F.2d 304, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law). Even
without applicable Nebraska state court decisions, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Anderson v. Nissan Motors Co., 139 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 1998) predicted
that no such general post-sale warning duty would be imposed under Nebraska
law. Id. at 602. In that action, involving injuries to a forklift operator, the plaintiff
claimed that the manufacturer owed a post-sale duty to warn of dangers of
operating the forklift without an operator restraint system. Id..
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS5 388 cmt. n (1965) (stating a method
of warning should give "reasonable assurance that the information will reach those
whose safety depends upon their having it").
16. Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 131415 (Kan.
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Distinct issues are raised by claims that a successor corporation
breached a duty to warn of product defects that it discovers, after
17
sale, in its predecessor's product. In Harris v. T.I., Inc., the
Virginia Supreme Court, "assuming without deciding that in the
proper case [the court] would recognize a successor corporation's
post-sale duty to warn[,]" found nevertheless that the plaintiff had
not proved a "special relationship" between the consumer and the
successor that would support finding such a duty."
The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability states a rule
proposing successor liability for failure to provide post-sale
warnings when:
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide services
for maintenance or repair of the product or enters into a
similar relationship with the purchasers of the
predecessor's product giving rise to actual or potential
economic advantage to the successor, and (2) a
reasonable person in the position of the successor would
19
provide a warning.
Many states have by statute adopted statutes of repose that
operate to extinguish any potential products liability claim upon
passage of a certain number of years following a product's initial
sale, without regard to whether or not a product has caused an
injurious accident or illness by that time. Among the cluster of
rationales for such legislation is that a statute of repose can give
1993). The Patton court noted, however, that ordinarily the manufacturer has no
duty to take the additional measure(s) of retrofitting or recalling the product. Id.
at 1315. See also discussion infra Part 111.
17. 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992).
18. Id. at 610, explained in Ambrose v. Southworth Products, Inc., 953 F.
Supp. 728, 733 (W.D. Va. 1997) (claim against successor of industrial elevator
manufacturer).
19. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCXS
LIABILI~Y§ 13(a)( I ) , (2)
(1997). The Products Liability Restatement Section 13(b) provides indicia for
determining whether "[a] reasonable person in the position of the successor
would provide a warning[,]" and states:
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a
warning if:
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know that the product
poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and
can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those
to whom a warning might be provided; and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing
a warning.
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finality to a seller's potential liability, with the advantages for
business planning and efficient procurement of insurance that
such finality brings. It would, therefore, seem to follow that upon
exhaustion of an applicable state repose period, a seller's potential
liability for any post-sale warning or other product-related
obligation would likewise cease. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
decided otherwise in Sharp v. Case ~ o r p .Sharp
~ ~ involved a suit
brought by a minor, an Oregon resident, and his parents against
the tractor manufacturer, alleging that a defect in the tractor's
power take-off (PYO) shaft caused it to engage without warning,
causing the seventeen year-old farm worker's arms to be drawn into
the baling mechanism, and amputating both beneath the elbow."
While ultimately deciding that the juxtaposition or Oregon law and
Wisconsin law on the issue presented only a false conflict, the
Wisconsin court adopted as authoritative the Oregon Supreme
Court's interpretation of its statute of repose as germane only to a
seller's acts or omissions to acts occurring before sale, and as not
"intend [ed] ...to immunize defendants for claims based upon
negligent acts or omissions committed after the sale of a product."22
It is necessary to note that the general post-sale warning
propositions regarding seller inquiry and advisory duties have little
applicability to the specialized duties of sellers of prescription
products.23 By statute and by decisional law, the seller of
prescription products has always been held to have a continuing
duty to advise governmental authorities of new information
regarding risk levels in use of his products, and to employ on an
ongoing basis their scientific and medical expertise to discover and
20. 595 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1999).
21. Id. at 383.
22. Id. at 385. The Sharp court continued by quoting the Oregon Supreme
Court's decision in Erickson Air-Crane v. United Tech. Corp., 735 P.2d 614, 618
(Or. 1987), to this effect:
[The legislature], in enacting [Oregon Statute] 30.905, contemplated
placing limits only on a defendant's exposure to liability for acts or
bmissions taking place before or at the time the defendant places the
product in the stream of commerce. Nothing in [Oregon Statute] 30.905
or its legislative history indicates that the legislative intent was to allow a
manufacturer to retreat to the date of "first purchase for use or
consumption" and raise the defense of [Oregon Statute] 30-905 for
negligent acts committed after the date of the first purchase[.]
23. "[Clourts traditionally impose a continuing duty of reasonable care to test
and monitor after sale to discover product-related risks" of prescription drugs and
devices. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 10
cmt. c (1997).
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advise health care professionals of new hazard related information.
Thus, with regard to manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, most
jurisdictions recognize a "continuous duty" to remain apprised of
new scientific and medical developments and to inform the
medical profession of pertinent information related to treatment
and side effects.24 This continuing informational obligation
imposed upon the manufacturer even after the marketing of the
product is not confined to the passive interpretation of scientific,
medical, or technical advances or revelations explored by third
parties.
Under certain circumstances, the pharmaceutical
manufacturer's continuing post-sale duties have been found to
include the initiation of further investigations, studies or tests.2i
Because the law of most states has essentially fused the concept
of strict liability failure to warn with that of negligent failure to
warn, some states recognizing post-sale advisory duties make no
distinction between claims brought in negligence and those
brought in strict tort liability. Decisions in other jurisdictions have
concluded, however, that important distinctions remain between

24. Id. ("With regard to ...p rescription drugs, courts traditionally impose a
continuing duty to test and monitor after sale to discover product-related risks.").
E.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1049-50 (Kan.
1984). In cases involving prescription drugs the courts have imposed a
"continuous duty to keep abreast of scientific developments touching upon the
manufacturer's product and to notify the medical profession of any additional side
effects discovered from its use ...." The drug manufacturer's duty to warn is,
therefore, commensurate not only with its actual knowledge gained from research
and adverse reaction reports, but also with its constructive knowledge as measured
by the scientific literature and other available means of communication.
Id. (quoting Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919,922 (8th Cir. 1970)).
Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the continuing investigational
duty described in Wooahson "should be narrowly applied to the facts peculiar to
the manufacture and distribution of ethical drugs." Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich
Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1308 (Kan. 1993); see also Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890
S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tenn. 1994) ("Manufacturers of prescription drugs, like
manufacturers of any other unavoidably dangerous product, have a duty to market
and distribute their products in a way that minimizes the risk or danger.");
Stanback v. Parke Davis & Co., 502 F. Supp. 767,769-70 (W.D.Va. 1980) (involving
suit brought by a patient who, after receiving flu vaccine, contracted GuillaneBarre Syndrome). In Stanback, the court stated, at id.:
Although the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer to warn is limited to
those dangers which the manufacturer knows or should know are
inherent in the use of the drug, the manufacturer is treated as an expert
in its particular field and is under a continuing duty to notify the medical
profession of any side effects subsequently discovered from its use.
25. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:P R O D U L~l S
A B l L I n 5 10 cmt. c (1997);
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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negligence and strict liability claims, and that those distinctions
commend recognition of a continuing duty in negligence, but not
in strict tort liability. As the Kansas Supreme Court explained in
26
Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., " [a] negligence
analysis is more appropriate than an application of strict liability in
the post-sale context" because "the emphasis in strict liability upon
the danger of the product rather than the conduct of the
manufacturer" requires recognition that if "a product is n o t . . .
unreasonably dangerous by the absence of warnings when it leaves
the manufacturer's control, it cannot at some later date become
unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of warnings."27
Whether a continuous seller advisory duty is recognized in
strict liability, in negligence or in both doctrines, the state by state
formulations-usually judicial-of the duty, explicitly or implicitly,
fall into four broad categories. In the first category, a seller may
have a duty to advise purchasers of latent product defects of which
the seller learns subsequent to initial sale. In the second category,
which is that adopted by Products Liability Restatement section 10,
a seller may have such a continuing duty without regard to whether
the product was defective at the time of sale, if a reasonable seller
would recognize a substantial product risk and take measures to
warn of it. A third position is that even should the post-sale
product risk be occasioned by product modification or misuse,
where such misuse or modification becomes known to the seller a
duty to warn of the risks may attach even if the misuse or alteration
would serve as a defense to a design defect claim. A fourth and
final basis for a continuing duty provides for recognition of a duty
that is triggered when a seller has sustained a level of contact with
the buyer or the user, or has undertaken initial remedial,
ameliorative or informational responsibilities, and the purchaser or
third parties have placed reliance upon its continuation. Each of
these four approaches will be discussed in order.
Latent Defect Not Discovered Until After Initial Sale. Both by
statutez8and by decisional law a "growing number" of jurisdictions
26. 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993).
27. Id. at 1310.
28. The pertinent provision of the Iowa Code states:
Nothing contained in this section shall diminish the duty of an
assembler, designer, supplier of specifications, distributor, manufacturer
or seller to warn of subsequently acquired knowledge of a defect or
dangerous condition that would render the product unreasonably
dangerous for its foreseeable use or diminish the liability for failure tb
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have expanded a seller's point-of-sale warning responsibilities "to
require warnings after the sale when the product later reveals a
defect not known at the time of sale."" As the following discussion
will demonstrate, where not required by statute, imposition of a
post-sale obligation will most frequently turn on consideration of
the nature and degree of the potential harm, and the feasibility of
undertaking such post-sale effort^.'^
While many states have yet to rule on the issue, a sturdy
minority have concluded that "[wlhen a manufacturer learns . . . of
the dangers associated with a reasonably foreseeable use of its
products after they are distributed . . . [it] must take reasonable
steps to warn reasonably foreseeable users about those dangers.. .,131
Under this emerging body of law of post-sale duties, a
manufacturer who, after the initial sale of the product, learns or
should have learned of latent product defects that render the
product not duly safe for foreseeable uses and who fails to warn the
purchaser or the consumer when a reasonable seller would have
done so may be liable for ersonal injury or property damage
B
proximately caused thereby.' As suggested, this scenario typically
warn.
IOM~A
CODE5 668.12 (1999).
29. Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa 1999) (noting Iowa
adoption of doctrine by statute).
30. Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D.
1994) (allegedly defective tire and wheel); Patton v. Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d at
131415 (allegedly defective farm equipment, with court writing that factors to
consider in deciding presence or absence of duty include nature and likelihood of
the injury, feasibility, expense, effectiveness of potential warning, and ability to
identify past purchasers); Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 866 (N.Y. 1984)
(alleged malfunction of acceleration system & brake failure).
31. Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1997) (Maine law).
LIABILIn RESTATEMENT
§ 10
32. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
cmt. b (1997) ("The standard governing the liability of the seller is objective:
whether a reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a warning.").
While Products Liability Restatement § 10 speaks in terms of sellers, cmt. b thereto
recognizes that manufacturers and non-manufacturing sellers are not similarly
situated:
In applying the reasonableness standard to members of the chain of
distribution it is possible that one party's conduct may be reasonable and
another's unreasonable. For example, a manufacturer may discover
information under circumstances satisfying [§IO(b)(l)-(4)] and thus be
required to provide a post-sale warning. In contrast, a retailer is
generally not in a position to know about the risk discovered by the
manufacturer after sale and thus is not subject to liability because it
neither knows nor should know of the risk. Once the retailer is made
aware of the risk, however, whether the retailer is subject to liability for
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involves (1) a product that is defective at the time of sale; (2) the
defect, due to its latent nature, is undetected prior to sale; and (3)
the defect becomes known or knowable-by consumer complaints,
related accidents or otherwise-only after the original sale."
An early and influential decision identifying a manufacturer's
post-sale duty to warn was entered in Comstock v. General Motors
34
Corp., which involved the alleged failure of the automobile
manufacturer to take remedial measures after learning, soon after
the model was put on the market, of a vulnerability of the vehicles'
brakes to failure. A personal injury claim was brought by a
mechanic at an automobile dealership who suffered severe injuries
when a car rolled unimpeded into him in a service bay. The court,
after first describing the manufacturer's general duty to warn at the
point of sale, stated that "a like duty to give prompt warning exists
when a latent defect which makes the product hazardous becomes
known to the manufacturer shortly after the product has been put
on the market.""
The Kansas Supreme Court took a harmonious approach in
36
Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufactum'ng Co., and while
highlighting the importance of the gravity of the harm, stated: "We
recognize a manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn ultimate
consumers ...when a defect, which originated at the time the
product was manufactured, is discovered to present a lifethreatenin hazard."37 To like effect is Korlowski v. John E. Smith
3
Sons Co., in which plaintiff alleged defective design and
inadequate warnings at the time of sale.39

8

failing to issue a post-sale warning depends on whether a reasonable
person in the retailer's position would warn under the criteria set forth in
[slo(b) (1)-(4)1.
33. Id. at 5 10 cmt. c (noting that a post-sale duty to warn may arise "when
new information is brought to the attention of the seller, after the time of sale,
concerning risks accompanying the product's use o r consumption.").
34. 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959).
35. Id. at 632; see also Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 521 N.W.2d 401,
407 (N.D. 1994) ("[ilnterpreting our products liability law to allow manufacturers
to ignore post-sale knowledge about dangers associated with products i s . . .
contrary to prevailing principles of negligence law").
36. 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993).
37. Id. at 1313.
38. 275 N.W.2d 915 (Wis. 1979).
39. Accord Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.
1983) (claim that manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings regarding
post point-of-sale discovery of hidden defect); Gregory v. Cincinnat Inc., 538
N.W.2d 325, 328 (Mich. 1995) ("[Blefore there can be a true continuing duty-
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After-Discovered Product Risk Irrespective of Point of Sale Defect. A
post-sale duty to warn may attach when the product, through use or
operation, has betrayed hazards not earlier known to the seller, or
to other sellers of like products.40Products Liability Restatement
section 10 adopts a conventional "reasonable seller" approach to
gauging whether such a duty exists on any particular set of facts.41
The section states that such a duty to provide post-sale warnings is
triggered "when a reasonable person in the seller's position would
provide such a warning."4' In assessing the reasonableness
standard, subsection (b) thereto suggests considering a number of
factors such as whether:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the
product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or
property; and (2) those to whom a warning might be
provided can be identified and may reasonably be
assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and (3) a
warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on
by those to whom the warning might be provided; and (4)
the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden
of providing a warning.43
On reasoning that can be reconciled with the Products
Liability Restatement emphasis upon hazard recognition and
warning feasibility, a New Jersey appeals court in Dixon v. Jacobsen
. ~ ~ "Where the manufacturer knew the identity of the
Mfg. C C Jstated:
whether it be to warn, repair or recall-there
must be a defect or actionable
problem at the point of manufacture."); see also Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 528
N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (held: manufacturer had no post-sale duty
when products were produced without defects; manufacturer not required to
provide notice of updated features).
40. Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp 728, 748 (D.N.J. 1995) (held:
manufacturer of garbage truck lacking safety decals warning of dangers posed by
using riding step while truck operating in reverse, a manufacturer had duty to
warn of dangers revealed by developing state of the art); see also Koker v.
Armstrong Cork, Inc., 804 P.2d 659, 666 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (in
shipyardworker's products liability action brought against manufacturers of
asbestos products manufacturers, held: "[the] duty to warn attaches, not when
scientific certainty of harm is established, but whenever a reasonable person using
the product would want to be informed of the risk of harm in order to decide
whether to expose himself to it."); see generally Robert E . Manchester, Consequences
of Failure to Recall Defctive Product at Earliest Possible Moment, 1 PROD.LIAB.L.J.76
(1988); Matula, supra note 5 at 3.
41. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)
OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILIn § 10 (a) (1997).
42. Id.
43. Id. a t § 10(b) (1)-(4).
44. 637 A.2d 915,92324 (N.J. App. Div. 1994).
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owner of its product, we have no hesitation in holding that such
[post-sale] duty existed, and it was for the jury to determine
whether that duty had been discharged."45 The Products Liability
Restatement "reasonable seller" position can be recognized as
providing for a duty that may be broader than that advanced in
Comstock and the cases following Comstock's approach, which is to
say, adoption of a requirement that plaintiff show that the product
had a point-of-sale (and presumably latent) defect. Products
Liability Restatement section 10 contains no such requirement.
Thus a warning duty may, of course, be found when a pre-existing
defect is or should have been discovered, but also when,
irrespective of defect, the hazard and the circumstances set forth in
section 10(b)(1)-(4) are such that a reasonable seller would
provide a post-sale warning.
The majority of jurisdictions have held that the manufacturer
of a nondefective product has no duty to warn prior purchasers of
new safety devices that are employed by the manufacturer or by
manufacturers of like product. In the words of one federal trial
court applying Pennsylvania law: "there is no cause of action for a
continuing duty to warn purchasers of new developments which
may make the product more safe."46Products Liability Restatement
section 10 makes clear its recognition that even if the product had
no latent defect at the time of initial sale, many products, while
nondefective and reasonably or duly safe at the time of sale, later
become recognized to pose avoidable (though not necessarily
unreasonable) risks of injury because later post-manufacture
advancements in science or technology permit an alternative and
45. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)
OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABIL
§ ~10 cmt. a (1997),
Reporters' Note.
46. Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 797 F. Supp. 381, 386 (M.D. Pa. 1992); see
also Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal
denied, 549 N.W.2d 563 (1996); Romero v. Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444,
1446 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law)(held: duty to provide prior
purchasers with advisories only appropriate upon proof that the product was
defective under standards existing at the time of manufacture) (collecting
authority); Moorehead v. Clark Equip. Co., No. 86 C 1442,.1987 WL 26158, at *5
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (applying Illinois law) (court rejects plaintiffs argument that there
existed a "continuing duty of a manufacturer to notify prior purchasers of new
safety devices"); see generally Comment, Gregoly TI. Cincinnati Incorporated: Searching
for Continuing Duty to Recall or Retrofit Products Under Michigan Law, 1996 DET. C.L.
MICH.ST.U. L. REV. 721 (1996). E.g., Williams v. Monarch Machine Tool Co., 26
F.3d 228, 223 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Maine law) (held: no manufacturer duty
"to advise purchasers about post-sale safety improvements that have been made to
a machine that was reasonably safe at the time of sale.").
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safer design. Still and all, section 10 should be interpreted as
suggesting that when a product is duly safe at the point of sale,
based upon then extant scientific, medical or technological
knowledge, even upon a plaintiffs showing that advancements in
knowledge would permit the product to be made more safely,
courts ought not make manufacturers responsible for advising
purchasers or consumers of the virtues of the safer product unless
"a reasonable person in the seller's position" would do so.47
The decisional law supports this position, and one finds ample
authority that a reasonable seller is not obligated to advise
purchasers or others regarding advancements in safety. This is
particularly so in settings in which the product, at the time of initial
sale, was not conspicuously obsolete and conformed to established
industry standard^.^' One rationale underlying the refusal of courts
to impose a general duty to advise past purchasers of technological
or safety advances is that an obligation upon manufacturers to
identify, locate and warn all users of safety improvements would
unreasonably burden a man~facturer.~'As most technologically
advanced products are regularly improved upon in terms of either
their effectiveness or their safety, one official comment to section
10 states plainly that it does not propose a post-sale warning duty
every time a subsequent design modification results in improved
safety.50 In this respect the official comments to Products Liability
Restatement section 10 adopt the prevailing rule that post-sale
warning duties do not extend to advisory notification of post-sale
safety improvements.51 Products Liability Restatement section 10 '
47. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
L I A B I L I§~10(a) (1997).
48. Wilson v. United States Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235, 237, 241 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1998) (no duty to provide post-sale advisories of improvements in elevator
door closing mechanism).
49. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: P R O D U ~LIABlLIn
S
§ 10(a) cmt. c
(1997) ("When risks are not actually brought to the attention of sellers, the cost of
constantly monitoring product performance in the field is usually too burdensome
to support a post-sale duty to warn."); see also Williams v. Monarch Machine Tool
Co., 26 F.3d 228, 232 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Massachusetts law) (holding latent
defects must exist before any post-sale duty arises); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich
Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1311 (Kan. 1993) (declining to "impose a requirement
that a manufacturer seek out past customers and notify them of changes in the
state of the art.").
LIABILITY
§ 10 cmt a. (1997).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
51. Accord Wilson v. United States Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1998). In Wilson,which involved a plaintiffs injury when his hand was caught in
the doors of an elevator, plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer had a duty to
advise the elevator purchaser (the premises manager) of a "shield sensor"
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comments caution, however, that such a post-sale inquiry and
potential warning obligation may exist "when reasonable grounds
exist for the seller to suspect that a hitherto unknown risk exists,
especially when the risk involved is great [.I "52
Products Liability Restatement subsections 10(b) (2) & (3)
suggest that the assessment of the presence or absence of duty take
into account that there will be varying degrees of feasibility in
identifying purchasers or current users. A motor vehicle, a piece of
capital equipment, or a durable and relatively expensive product
such as a meat slicer used in a sandwich shop, will often be
traceable through the location of product identification numbers,
returned warranty cards, dealer records, or other fairly accessible
means. For such products, where the other criteria of section
10(b) are met, application of the liability rule that section imposes
will be appropriate.
For other classes of products,
price,
perishability, limited useful life, or the availability of such products
through typical over-the-counter markets which characteristically
do not involve recording the purchasers' name, will militate against
finding a post-sale duty to warn individual product users or
consumers. Products Liability Restatement section 10 comment (e)
observes that when customer records are not available, it becomes
more difficult for sellers to iden* its product users for whom
warnin s would be useful and may prevent a post-sale duty from
53
arising.
In some circumstances, nonetheless, the absence of
means for individual consumer identification will not obviate the
appropriateness of a post-sale warning duty, such as, for example, if
"customer records ...identify the population to whom warnings
should be provided.. . [or] indicate classes of product users, or
geographically limited markets[,]" thereby permitting post-sale
warnings by public notice.54
Products Liability Restatement section 10(b)(4), which
emphasizes the centrality of considering the severity of the
potential injury in assessing continuing seller duties, is in
available after the manufacture and sale of the elevator in question. Id. at 237-38.
Held: "the fact that other safety methods were available imposed no duty on the
manufacturer to 'produce a machine which incorporated only the ultimate in
safety features."' Id. at 238 (quoting Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, P.2d
1315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS:P R O D U ~LIABILITY
S
at 5 10 cmt. c.
(1997).
53. Id. at 5 10 (b) (3) cmt. e.
54. Id.
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agreement with the decisional law holding that where the severity
of the potential injury is modest (as opposed to substantial, or
serious), a continuing duty to provide warnings should not be
imposed. While adopting in general terms a post-sale duty
identified by the Products Liability Restatement, courts in some
jurisdictions place particular emphasis upon the magnitude of
danger factor. For example, in Crowston v. Goodyear Tire €3~ u b b e r , ~ ~
the plaintiff, a service station employee, was injured while inflating
a 16 inch truck tire on a mismatched 16.5 inch
He sued
Goodyear, the tire manufacturer, and Kelsey-Hayes Co., the wheel
manufacturer, arguing that they had a post-sale duty to warn
consumers and users about dangers of mi~rnatchin~.~'
The North
Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that the law of that state
recognized post-sale advisory duties in "special" circumstance^.^^ On
the facts before it, the state high court held that the peril of tire
rim and wheel mismatching was saciently
great in terms of
seriousness of injury and the large number of persons who might
be exposed to the risk as to warrant im osition of a post-sale
informational duty upon the man~facturer.~
Applying Minnesota law, a federal district court in McDaniel v.
Bieffe USA, ~ n c . ~ 'found that the manufacturer of a motorcycle
helmet had a post-sale duty to warn of the risks of misusing the
helmet's Velcro strap by employing it as a substitute for proper
fastening of the helmet's actual chin strap.61 The claim arose
following a fatal accident in which a motorcyclist's helmet
dislod ed in an accident in which he was hit by a van that ran a red
light.6 The specific risk pertaining to the Velcro strip on the
helmet's chin strap was that the strip was a feature intended only
"to give the rider a means of fastening down the loose end of the
strap after it [had] been passed through the retaining bar.'@
Decedent's representatives claimed that from a human factors
standpoint, the design was defective, in that it "induce [dl.. .users

'k

B

521 N.W.2d 401,405 (N.D. 1994).
Id. at 405.
Id. at 405-06.
Id. at 409.
Id.
35 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D. Minn. 1999).
Id. at 736, 743.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 736.
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to fasten the strap" improperly,"64which is to say, users might
employ the Velcro surface to actually fasten the helmet, and forego
passing the strap through the retaining bar.
The federal trial court noted that the Minnesota Supreme
Court had explicitly recognized a post-sale duty to warn in "special
cases."" The "special cases" language derived from the state high
66
court decision in Hodder v. Goodyear Tire €9Rubber Co., also a tire
rim personal injury case, in which the Minnesota high court
emphasized the following findings: (1) the manufacturer had
known for years that the rims "could be temperamental"; (2) "that
the margin for error in servicing [the rims] was dangerously small;"
(3) that when accidents occurred they usually resulted in death or
serious bodily injury; and (4) that the defendant had plied the tire
rim trade for many years, and even after ceasing production of the
rim, had continued to sell tires and other products for use with the
67
rims.
Since Hodder, the McDaniel court noted, observed, Minnesota
courts and federal courts applying Minnesota law had found a postsale duty to warn based upon the relative presence or absence of
"Hodder factors."68 Finding that the McDaniel facts included some
Hodder factors,6gand did not include others,70and noting further
64. Id.
65. Id. at 73940.
66. 426 N.W.2d 826,823 (Minn. 1988).
67. Id. at 833.
68. McDaniel, 35 F. Supp.2d at 740:
Relying opon Hodder, a few Minnesota courts, and federal courts applying
Minnesota law, have recognized or discussed post-sale warning duties, e.g., T.H.S.
Northstar Assocs. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 66 F.3d 173, 177 (8th Cir. 1995) (&rming
district court decision to allow .jury determination of whether asbestos
manufacturer breached its post-sale duty to warn); Ramstad v. Lear Siegler
Diversified Holdings Corp., 836 F. Supp. 1511, 1517 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding
auger manufacturer had no post-sale duty to warn of dangers associated with auger
because numerous Hodderfactors not present); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707
F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (D. Minn. 1989) (recognizing post-sale duty to warn, and
corresponding duty to test for alleged dangers associated with intrauterine
contraceptive device); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96,100-01 (Minn.
1989) (holding a successor corporation has no post-sale duty to warn of product
defects where successor never succeeded to any s e ~ c contracts,
e
was not aware of
claimed defects, and did not know of location of the product at time of plaintiffs
injury).
69. The court noted specifically issues of fact as to whether the manufacturer
had reason to know of the risk, including (1) the latency of the risk; (2) the
potential for death or serious bodily injury; and (3) the continued sale of similar
products. McDaniel, 35 F. Supp. at 740.
70. Bieffe had not continued to senice the product, had not remained in
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the absence of an explanation in Hodder of "what factors are
determinative in deciding when to impose a post-sale duty-to
warn[,] "71 the McDaniel court denied defendant Bieffe's motion for
summary judgment as to the post-sale duty to warn count,
concluding that under Minnesota law, material issues of fact existed
72
as to the manufacturer's warning obligations.
~rowston,~\eferenced above, placed reliance upon Hodder in
reaching its holding that Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. had a duty
to advise past purchasers of a post-point of sale discovery of the
danger of mismatching a sixteen-inch tire with a sixteen-and-one74
half inch rim. Deciding that the logic of Hodder was sufficiently
broad to-- commend its application to mass market consumer
products,'" the South Dakota Supreme Court found the facts before
it were aligned significantly with those considered by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Hoddm
In both cases, serious injury was a consequence of the dangers
associated with the use of the product. The defendants became
aware of those dangers after the manufacture and sale of the
product, and those dangers may have been eliminated by
appropriate post-sale warnings. The number of individuals
exposed to the potential dangers in both cases was significant.
Although the number of.. . [the products] produced militates
against individualized notice to the original purchasers, that
same factor suggests that manufacturers cannot totally ignore
post-sale information which has the potential to prevent serious
76
injury to so many people.
A continuing duty to warn was found in Alexander v. Morning
77
Pride Manufacturing, Inc., a suit brought by fire fighters against the
manufacturer of fire fighting "bunker gear" that allegedly failed to
protect plaintiffs adequately against burns when they knelt on hot
18
surfaces. The plaintiffs complained that the material in the knees
-

--

--

--

-

-

- -

contact with users, and had not undertaken a duty to keep purchasers advised of
product developments. Id. at 740-41.
71. Id. at 741.
72. Id. at 741-743.
73. 521 N.W.2d 401,408-09 (N.D. 1994).
74. Id. at 409.
75. Id. at 408 ("Simply because a product is mass produced and widely
distributed does not totally absolve a manufacturer of a post-sale duty to warn
under ordinary negligence principles.").
76. Id. at 409.
77. 913 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
78. Id. at 364.
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of the bunker gear, when compressed by the firefighters' kneeling,
lost its heat-protective characteristics, and that in use, the
defendant's protective gear bunker gear gave them no physical
notice, such as by gradual warming, of the need to move their
knees from the source of the heat. Rather, the complaint
contended, the condition of the product created an unreasonable
risk of serious burns before the fire fighters could take ordinary
79
Denying the manufacturer's
measures to protect themselves.
motion for summaryjudgment, the federal trial court wrote:
As the Court instructed the jury, a manufacturer's duty to
warn of inherent limitations in a product is a continuing
one. Nevertheless, the testimony was clear that even after
Morning Pride learned the 'horrendous' news that
Philadelphia fire fighters were being burned, [it] never
warned them, although it could easily have contacted
[them] directly and warned them of the gear's

limitation^.^^

Post-Sale Duties Surviving Modzfication or Misuse of Product.
Noteworthy as well are the situations in which the manufacturer
has knowledge that its product is subject to systematic modification
or misuse that elevates the risk of harm. When the manufacturer
has actual or constructive knowledge that its product has been
subject to widespread user modification, and there is information
suggesting that such modifications create a risk of injury to persons
or damage to property, the manufacturer's obligation to issue post
point-of-sale advisories will depend upon the foreseeability of harm
that may be occasioned by such modifications or alterations."
79. Id. a t 367. As explained by a 1991 revised sheet issued by defendant:
"Wetness and compressio& both reduce system insulation. M'hen the system is
BOTH wet and compressed, (i.e., the fire fighter kneeling after sweating in his
liner; the increase in protection is even more pronounced (even worse the
decrease is in the area of warning time). According to the evidence, no fire
fighters received this user sheet, and the manufacturer withdrew it from use three
years later." Id. at 368-69.
80. Id. at 368.
81. E.g., Piper v. Bear Med. Sys. Inc., 883 P.2d 407, 414 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
("[A] manufacturer may be liable for a failure to warn of dangers of product
modifications that it knew or had reason to know were occurring."); Village of
Groton v. Tokheim Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 565,568 (App.Div. 1994) (imposing upon
manufacturer duty to warn authorized and unauthorized distributors after
learning that product was being used with another product in a dangerous
manner); see also Perry v. Rockwell Graphics Systems, Inc., Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH)
1 27,445 (D. Mass.1985) (not reported in F. Supp.). Perry involved a worker's
injuries,
sustained in 1982, while using a cardboard cutting machine
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In many instances a post-sale product modification or the
misuse of a product may be of a sufficient order of magnitude and
so unforeseeable as to itself become the producing cause of the
plaintiffs harm.
One might first suppose that in such
circumstances the manufacturer could not possibly be found liable
for failing to provide warnings against a plaintiffs action that
might, in ordinary circumstances, be shown to be a superceding
cause of his harm, and a thus complete defense to any design
defect claim that might be brought against the manufacturer. The
issue then arises as to whether and in what circumstances a
continuing warning duty might nevertheless be imposed even when
product alteration or misuse would preclude a finding of defective
design.
A leading decision in this regard is that reached by the New
. ~ ~ involved a
York Court of Appeals in Liriano u. Hobart ~ o r p Liriano
seventeen year-old grocery store employee who had his right hand
and lower forearm amputated following an injury while using the
store's meat grinder.s3 A safety device sold as original equipment
with the product, and designed to prevent a user's hand from
coming into contact with the grinder's feeding tube and "worm,"
had been removedB4.No warnings were on the machine indicatin
the dangers of using the machine without the safety guard.
Removal of the guard by persons unknown had taken r$ice during
the time of its operation on the grocery store premises.
The evidence showed that Hobart, the manufacturer, had
learned "that a significant number of purchasers of its meat
grinders had removed the safety guards[,] " and had commenced to
affix warnings to new machines being sold, but had taken no effort
to advise earlier purchasers of the risk." The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals certified to the New York high court the question of
whether or not "manufacturer liability exist under a failure to warn
theory in cases in which the substantial modification defense would

%i

manufactured by defendant in 1914. Held: the manufacturer's "actual or
imputed" knowledge of "widespreadmodification" of its presses in the cardboard
industry "could be the basis for liability for failure to warn of hazards discovered
after manufacture of the machine." Id. at 27,719.
82. 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998).
83. Id. at 305.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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preclude liability under a design defect theory.. ..,988 The New York
Court of Appeals answered in the
It commented that
under New York law, a manufacturer has "a duty to warn of the
danger of unintended uses of a product provided these uses are
reasonably foreseeablevsgand explained:
The justification for the post-sale duty to warn arises from
the manufacturer's unique (and superior) position to
follow use and adaptation of its product by consumers.
Compared to purchasers and users of a product, a
manufacturer is best placed to learn about the post-sale
defects or dangers discovered in use. A manufacturer's
superior position to garner information and its
corresponding duty to warn is no less with respect to the
ability to learn of modifications made to or misuse of a
product.. .. This Court therefore concludes that
manufacturer liability can exist under a failure to warn
theory in cases in which a substantial modification
defense.. .might otherwise preclude a design defect
claim.90
Post-Sale Duties Arising- From Seller Conduct. Some decisions
falling within this final category seemingly recognize that upon
particular facts, continuing advisory duties may arise when a seller
has undertaken some level of cautionary effort upon which a
product user has relied, thereby creating, plaintiff alleges, an
obligation to continue to advise or warn on an ongoing b a s i ~ . ~
The
'
fourth category of decisions that have evaluated post-sale warning
or advisory duties have employed criteria similar in ways to those
adopted in Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber ~0.'' and McDaniel v.
93
Bieffe USA, Inc., discussed above. However in these cases, the
courts have adopted the analysis of Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 3244, which states a rule that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
--

88. Id. at 304.
89. Id. at 305 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 307-08 (citations omitted).
91. See generally Artiglio v. Coming Incorporated, 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998)
(alleging defendant's toxicology research established such an "undertaking");
Walton v. Avco. Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992) (held: post-sale duty to warn
where the manufacturer of a crucial component part of a helicopter was notified
of product defect by subcontractor and had remained in contact with the owner).
92. 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988).
93. 35 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D. Minn. 1999) (applying Minnesota law).
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necessary for the protection of the third person or his
things, is subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to [perform]94his updertaking, if (a) his
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty
owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is
suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.g5
Illustrative of such a "negligent undertaking" claim is that
resolved by the California Supreme Court decision in Artzglio v.
96
Corning, Inc., the review of an action brought by recipients of
silicone gel breast implants against the manufacturer of the
implants and its parent corporation. With specific regard to the
claim against one of two parent corporations, Dow Chemical
Company, plaintiffs asserted that (1) Dow had conducted
toxicology research concerning various silicone products; (2) it had
provided this research to the manufacturing subsidiary, Dow
Corning Corp.; (3) the research "implicate[d] the well-being and
protection of third parties [the implant recipients]"; and (4) the
manufacturer's various undertakings with the research were
The trial court
summary
conducted negligently."
The California
judgment, and the appellate court
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, and in its holding
emphasized two shortcomings of plaintiffs "negligent undertaking"
count. First, the court found that once Dow had undertaken and
shared its toxicological research, it did not incur thereby an
obligation to conduct additional research and to advise either its
subsidiary or the third party implant recipients indefinitely.gg In
reaching this conclusion, the court quoted authority suggesting
that "[tlhe duty of a 'good Samaritan' is limited. Once he has
performed his voluntary act he is not required to continue to
render aid indefinitely[,]" and that an initial act taken to protect
another does not make the actor "the guarantor of [the third

ranted

94. In the published Restatement provision, the bracketed word appears as
"protect." Use of that word has been widely recognized as mistaken, and courts
have instead substituted the word "provide."
OF TORTS
§ 324A (1965).
95. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
96. 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998).
97. Id. at 1319-20.
98. Id. at 1316.
99. Id. at 1319.
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party's] future ~afety."'~'Secondly, the court wrote, the record
revealed that other than the provision of early studies, Dow had
engaged in no operational contact with Dow Corning, such as
inspecting or testing the devices manufactured by its subsidiary that
might form the basis for a relational argument for a post-sale duty,
101
or the basis for any claim of detrimental reliance.
Whatever obstacles may stand in the way of a plaintiffs
recovery under a "negligent undertaking" theory, there is broad
authority for the proposition that the presence or absence of a
post-sale warning obligation may turn upon the manufacturer's
post-sale activities. Where a manufacturer has continued, for
example, to promote a product as safe, a warning obligation may
attach upon its learning of information indicating the contrary.
102
For example, in T.H.S. Northstar & Assoc. v. WR. Grace & Co., a
Minneapolis building owner sued for cleanup and abatement costs,
alleging that Grace's Monokote 3 fireproofing product
103
contaminated the premises with asbestos.
Subsequently, the
federal appeals court affirmed an award of damages to plaintiff
entered by a jury that had been instructed as to a limited
104
manufacturer continuing duty to warn.
Grace argued that
evidence adduced at trial fell short of a showing of "special
I05
circumstances" that would create an ex post warning obligation.
The appeals court disagreed, finding that under applicable
Minnesota law, such a "special circumstances" duty could be found
to exist when "(1) the manufacturer insisted that its product was
safe if used properly; (2) it became evident to the manufacturer
over time that great care was required in the handling and
servicing of the product, or serious injury would occur; and ( 3 ) the
manufacturer continued in the business of selling related products
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1320 (citing Temporomandibular Joints (TMJ) Implants, 113 F.3d
1184, 1194 (8th Cir. 1997)).
102. 66 F.3d 173 (8th Cir. 1995).
103. Id. at 174.
104. The trial court's instruction read, id. at 176:
[I]f a manufacturer learns that a previously distributed product poses a
danger to users, it must give additional warnings or instructions that will
enable users to make informed decisions and use the product safely. . . .
A manufacturer has no duty to warn, however, if the user is or should be
fully aware of the dangers hherent in a product, but past experience or
familiarity with the product does not necessarily alert a user to all of the
dangers associated with the product.
105. Id.
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and undertook a duty to warn users of post-sale hazards."Io6
Along a similar line of reasoning is Calderon v. Machinenfabm'ek
Bollegraff Appingedam BV.'~' C a b o n was a suit brought by a paper
baling machine operator against a service distributor whose agent
made a post-sale service call, during which the service distributor's
agent observed the hazardous condition created by the machine
owner's removal of safety gates. An operator thereafter sustained
severe injuries while reaching into the machine to untangle wires as
the machine was still running, and suit was brought claiming that
the service distributor had a duty to advise the operator or the
operator's employer of the hazardous condition. The New Jersey
court found that the trial court's removal of plaintiffs failure to
warn count was error, as a jury might have found that the service
distributor "had assumed an obligation to warn" the machine
108
owner.
It found the error harmless, however, in light of
persuasive evidence that any failure of the service distributor to
provide post-sale cautionary information was the legal cause of
plaintiffs harm, as the weight of the evidence supported the
conclusion that any warning from defendant would not have been
heeded by the plaintiffs employer.10g
The "special relationship" or "special circumstances" rationale
for evaluating a claimed warning duty was developed further in
Birchler v. Gehl CO."' In that decision, the Seventh Circuit, applying
Illinois law, considered appellant's assignment of error to the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury that a hay bailer manufacturer
had a post-sale duty to warn of the risks created by the fact,
appellant claimed, that the baler took in hay faster than an
operator could release it. Affirming a defense verdict, the appeals
court noted first that Illinois law does not recognize a general post111
sale duty to warn.
The court distinguished Seegers G a i n Co., Inc.
112
v. United States Steel Corp., which involved the explosion of a grain
storage tank, which due to its steel construction, was unable to

106. Id. (relying upon Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d
826 (Minn. 1988)).
107. 667 A.2d I l l 1 (N.J. Super. 1995).
108. Id. at 1115.
109. Id. at 1116.
110. 88 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 52l(citing Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589 N.E.2d 569, 579 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991)); Kempes v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., 548 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989); Collins v. Hyster Co., 529 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
112. 577 N.E.2d 1364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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withstand the cold Illinois winter temperatures. Plaintiffs therein
claimed that the seller knew of a prior accident that was virtually
indistinguishable from the accident that caused their loss, and that
their vendor knew specifically that the steel seller knew precisely
the use to which the steel it sold would be put."J In contrast, the
Birchler court continued, the appellant's claim before it involved
"no personal relationship" between seller and buyer that would
permit the seller to know how the product would be used, and
sounded instead in the very language the Seegers court had used to
distinguish its facts in such a way as to permit its departure from
Illinois authority finding no post-sale warning obligation, i.e.,
settings in which courts declined to impose a continuing advisory
duty in claims involving "an over-the-counter sale of a generic
product for use by an unknown c~nsumer.""~

Plaintiffs often allege simultaneously that a manufacturer has
breached both (1) a potential post-sale warning obligation; and
(2) a potential recall or retrofit obligation.
Courts and
commentators, in turn, often discuss the bona fides of such claims
as though are related closely, or even allied. However, the two
claims are markedly different, and require separate analysis.
Perhaps most fundamentally, in terms of the burden upon the
manufacturer, the practical consequences of imposing a recall or
retrofit obligation would typically be, and in several orders of
magnitude, far greater than would be a requirement of even the
most extensive continuing duty to warn.
The far more costly and complex obligation to recall a product
is readily distinguishable from, and more costly than, a post-sale
duty to warn, as the would require the manufacturer to regain
control over the entire product line, and to retrofit or upgrade it,
incurring far higher internal and external costs than would be
115
involved with a post-sale duty to warn. As, through technological

113. Id. at 1374.
114. Id. at 1373-74.
115. RESTATEMENT(THIRD)
OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 11 cmt. a ("Duties
to recall products impose significant burdens on manufacturers. Many product
lines are beriodically-redesigned so that they become safer over time. 1f every
improvement in product safety were to trigger a common-law duty to recall,
manufacturers would face incalculable costs every time they sought to make their
product lines better and safer.").
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advancements, products are continually being made safer and
better, manufacturers would confront "incalculable costs" if the
1 6
had to upgrade a product every time an improvement was made.
Accordingly, the decisional law has adopted without deviation the
rule that progress in technology that would permit, or have
permitted, the design and manufacture of an improved and safer
product will not trigger a seller duty to undertake a recall or other
refitting efforts."'
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 11
suggests a rule in which a seller incurs no recall duty unless such
118
action is required by statute or regulation, or the seller, having
voluntarily commenced to recall a product, "fails to act as a
reasonable person in recalling the product.""g Section 11 would
impose a duty upon the seller to recall a defective product after the
time of sale when a statute or other governmental regulation

7

116. Id.
L m I L I n 5 11 cmt. a, illus. 1
(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
117. RESTATEMENT
states this hypothetical:
MNO Corp. has manufactured and distributed washing machines for five
years. MNO develops and improved model that includes a safety device
that reduces the risk of harm to users. The washing machines sold
previously conformed to the best technology available at the time of sale
is under no common-law
and were not defective when sold. M ~ O
obligation to recall previously-distributed machines in order to retrofit
them with the new safety device.
118. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 11 provides:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
is subject to liability for harm to persons o r property caused by a seller's
failure to recall a product after the time of sale or distribution if:
(a)(]) a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or
administrative regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to
recall the product; o r
(2) the seller o r distributor, in the absence of a recall requirement under
Subsection (a) (1), undertakes to recall the product; and
(b) the seller o r distributor fails to act as a reasonable man in recalling
the product.
Id. at § 11 cmt. a ("Issues relating to product recalls are best evaluated by
governmental agencies capable of gathering adequate data regarding the
ramifications of such undertakings."). Examples of decisions finding no common
law recall or related duty are Anderson v. Nissan Motor Co., 139 F.3d 599 (8th Cir.
1998) (predicting Nebraska law in claim alleging manufacturer duty to equip
previously sold forklift with operator restraint); Habecker v. Copperly Corp., 893
F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[Nlo Pennsylvania case has recognized a duty to retrofit,
and, indeed, one has suggested that such a duty would be inappropriate under
established principles of Pennsylvania law.") (citing Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln
Plaza Assoc., 548 A.2d 1276,1281 (Pa. Super. 1988)).
(THIRD)OF TORTS:PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
§ 11(2) (b) (1997).
119. RESTATEME~
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specifically requires a recall or when the seller voluntarily recalls
the product and fails to act as would a reasonable person in
recalling the
The rationale for a rule that would impose liability only when
the supplier is required specifically by statute or regulation to recall
the product is based upon the recognition that the origination of
any such duty would require a complex and polycentric evaluation
of (1) breadth of risk; (2) severity of risk; (3) examination of
alternative remedial measures; (4) financial and other costs to the
manufacturer; and (5) the logistics, management and practicality
of such an obligation. Such an evaluation, the logic continues, is
best left to such government agencies as enjoy supervisory authority
over the safety of like products, as they are (1) most practiced in
the collection of risk and incident data; and (2) more expert than
would be the manufacturer in assessing the benefits and the
burdens of a recall; and (3) should a recall obligation be imposed,
most able to work with the manufacturer to design and delimit the
initiative in order to secure optimal results."'
When a seller undertakes a voluntary recall, the Products
Liability Restatement commends a rule for tort liability should the
seller "fai[l] to act as a reasonable man in recalling the product."122
Products Liability Restatement section 11 comment c explains that
the reasoning for such an approach "lies partly in the general rule
that one who undertakes a rescue, and thus induces other wouldbe-rescuers to forbear, must act reasonably in following
Comment c notes tellingly that "courts appear to assume that
voluntary recalls are typically undertaken in the anticipation that, if
the seller does not recall voluntarily, it will be required to do so by
a government r e g u l a t ~ r . " ' ~ ~
Comment c concludes: "Having
presumably forestalled the regulatory requirement, the seller
should be under a common law duty to follow through in its
commitment to re~all."'~'
Informative in this connection, albeit in the context of an
accident following a mandatory recall, in Spn'ngmeyer v. Ford Motor
~ 0 . ' a' ~California appeals court considered the claim of a mechanic
120. Id.
121. Id. at § 11 cmt. a.
122. Id. at § 11 cmt. c
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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who was injured when a truck fan blade disengaged and struck
him. The evidence suggested that the truck's prior owner, the
lessor Avis, might not have responded to the manufacturer's timely
recall initiatives. While stating the general proposition that a
manufacturer's duty to produce a duly safe product is non127
delegable,
the California court reversed judgment for the
mechanic, relying in part upon Ford's showing that its follow-up
procedures for its recall showed due care, and included, among
other efforts, an original recall notice to the prior owner, and two
follow-up notices to the new owner, even absent a regulatory
128
obligation to do so.
129
the claim of a
Similarly, in Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co.,
dockworker whose legs were crushed by a straddle carrier used to
move shipping containers, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed
plaintiffs damage award on his claim that the manufacturer had a
duty to retrofit its product with safety devices unavailable at the
130
time of initial sale.
The court stated: "[Wle hold that a
manufacturer has no duty to 'retrofit' its products with 'aftermanufacture' safety equipment, although it may be found negligent
or strictly liable for failing to install such equipment-or
not
otherwise making its product safer-existing
at the time of
rnan~facture."~~'
Likewise, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
assessing Pennsylvania law, has noted that "no Pennsylvania case
has recognized a duty to retrofit[.]"132As the court explained: "A
majority of jurisdictions hold that a duty to recall or retrofit will be
127. Id. at 202.
128. Id. at 20405 (noting that third-party negligence may constitute
superseding cause when so extraordinary as to be unforeseeable).
129. 944 P.2d 1279 (Haw. 1997).
130. Id. at 1291.
131. Id.
132. Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln Plaza Assoc., 548 A.2d 1276, 1281 (Pa. Super 1988).
The Habeckercourt stated at id.:
[Tlhe precise question presented for decision is this-in a negligence
product liability case, where a manufacturer exercises reasonable care in
producing a product which functions properly until the time of the
accident and does not retain any post-sale responsibility for or control
over its product, but where it is proven that at the time of the accident
the manufacturer knew o r should have known of an alternative design,
which may be safer, is the manufacturer negligent if it does not retrofit its
already sold products, or at least notify the owners of the product of the
new design? [We d o not] think that the imposition of such a duty would
be appropriate under established principles of negligence liability.
Id.

Heinonline - - 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 6 0 2000-2001

20001

MODERN POST-SALE WARNINGS

61

recognized only where the product was sold in a dangerously
defective condition, the risks of which only came to the
manufacturer's attention after initial sale."'33
Reaching a conflicting decision, but on facts distinguishable in
significant respects from the above authority is the decision in
134
Downing v. Ouerhead Door Corp., a suit against the manufacturer of
a garage door opener that had an activator button within the reach
of children. Learning of the risks involved, the manufacturer
undertook to warn new purchasers of the product, but did not
warn previous purchasers. Rejecting the defendant's argument that
its warning duties extended only to new purchasers, the Colorado
Appeals Court stated, in terms applicable to warning and recall
obligations alike:
The duty to warn exists where a danger concerning the
product becomes known to the manufacturer subsequent
to the sale and delivery of the product, even though it was
not known at the time of the sale. After a product
involving human safety has been sold and dangerous
defects in design have come to the manufacturer's
attention, the manufacturer has a duty either to remedy
such defects, or, if a complete remedy is not feasible, to
give users adequate warnings and instructions concerning
methods for minimizing danger.'''
Downing has been interpreted as pertaining only to products
that were defective at the time of manufacture, not to products
"which could subsequently be made safer by a later developed
safety device or design improvement."'36 In agreement with this
limiting assessment of Downing is the Tenth Circuit decision in
137
Romero u. International Harvester Co., an action arising from the
133.

Seegenerally Romero v. Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1992).

E.g., Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[A] product
can only be defective if it is imperfect when measured against a standard existing
at the time of sale or against reasonable consumer expectations held at the time of
sale."); Dion v. Ford Motor Co., 804 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("Ford
did not have a duty to improve upon the safety of its tractor by replacing an
existing rollover protection system within improved rollover protection systems.");
Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988)
(applying Missouri law, and holding that defendant was "not negligent as a matter
of law in failing to retrofit the allegedly defective aerial bucket lift").
134. 707 P.2d 1027 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
135. Id. at 1033 (citations omitted).
136. Romero v. Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F. 2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992)
(applying Colorado law).
137. Id.
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death of a farm worker while using a tractor, manufactured and
sold in 1963 without a roll bar (or ROPS - Roll-Over Protection
System). Although at the time of its manufacture the tractor met all
of the applicable government and industry standards for safety,
plaintiff, noting laterdeveloped rollover protection devices,
claimed the manufacturer was negligent in failing to retrofit the
equipment. Observing that Colorado law recognized no "rigid
distinction" between claims in negligent failure to warn and strict
liability failure to warn, and further interpreting plaintiffs warnings
claims as co-extensive with the claims in failure to retrofit, the court
concluded that no Colorado authority supported the proposition
that a claim against a manufacturer "should be exempted from
having to show a negligent or defective design under standards
existing at the time of manufacture and sale. . . .,,IS8 In Oja v.
139
Howmedica, Inc., the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in
Romero, and held that no post-sale duty to warn or otherwise
remedy a claimed hazard extended to a manufacturer when the
product was not defective at the point of initial sale."'40
The Michigan Supreme Court confirmed the absence of a
manufacturer's post-sale duty to recall or repair an allegedly
141
defective product in Gregmy v. Cincinnati, Inc., an action deriving
from a sheet metal worker's injuries while operating a press brake.
The defect pleaded was in the brake's allegedly inadequate
guarding of the "point of operation," and also the lack of a guard
to prevent inadvertent activation of the product with its foot
At trial, the jury was instructed that a manufacturer "has a
duty to incorporate new advances in technology[,] and that 'a
manufacturer who learns of a design defect after the product has
138. Id. at 1452.
139. 111 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997).
140. Id. at 791 (quoting Perlmutler v. United States Gypsum Co., 4 F.3d 864,
869 (10th Cir. 1993))(claim alleging defective hip prosthesis). Accord Anderson v.
Nissan Motor Co., 139 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Nebraska law to a claim
brought by an injured employee who alleged that defendant's forklift was defective
for want of an operator restraint system). The court stated:
The Nebraska S u ~ r e m Court
e
has not s~ecificallvaddressed the issue of
whether it would recognize either a post-sale duty to warn o r a duty to
retrofit. The district court determined that, when called upon to decide
the issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court would not be likely to recognize
either cause of action. After a d e novo review, we agree with the district
court's determination.. ..
Id. at 602.
141. 538 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1995).
142. Id. at 327.
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been sold has a duty to take reasonable steps to correct the
defect.ttt149 A Michigan appeals court reversed and remanded, and,
144
reviewing Comstock. v. General Motors C*.,
held that while "a
manufacturer has a duty to warn of a latent defect, [it] does not
have a duty to repair a latent defect."'45 Noting that the issue
presented was one of "public policy," appropriate for the legislature
to address,'46 the court distinguished the settings in which this
issue might arise: (1) a defect known to the manufacturer at the
point of manufacture, i.e., while the product was yet in the
manufacturer's control; and (2) the absence of a defect, in terms of
the state of the art at the time of manufacture, but with post-sale
advancements in technology rendering the product arguably
defective under subsequent analysis.14' Finding that appellant's
allegation of defect did not pertain to a latent point-of-manufacture
defect, but rather a "defect" by dint of technological advances, the
Michigan Supreme Court distinguished Comstock, and found no
duty to repair or recall under Michigan law.14'
The Michigan court further noted that adoption of a recall
or retrofit duty would muddy the factfinder consideration of the
issue of design defect, and explained: "Because a prima facie case
[of design defect] is established once the risk-utility test is proven,
we are persuaded that it is unnecessary and unwise to impose or
introduce an additional duty to retrofit or recall a product.
Focusing on post-manufacture conduct in a negligent design case
improperly shifts the focus from point-of-manufacture conduct and
considers post-manufacture conduct and technology that
accordin 1 has the potential to taint a jury's verdict regarding a
defect."14
Similarly, when a product is not defective at the time of

FY

143. Id. at 328.
144. 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959).
145. Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 328.
146. Id. at 330.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 334. The court stated:
At issue in this case is the propriety of a continuing duty to repair or
recall theory of products liability in a negligent design case. The inquiry
is whether Michigan law recognizes a continuing duty to repair or
recall.. .We hold that there is no continuing duty to repair or recall.. .a
product.
Id. at 336; see also Patton v. Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993)
(interpreting Kansas law in reaching conclusion similar to that in Orego~y).
149. Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 333.
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manufacture, but is subsequently made safer by advancements in
technology, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Reeves v.
Cincinnati, ~nc.'~'
that a manufacturer has no duty to advise former
purchasers of the existence or the availability of such
advancements.15' The Reeues court relied on Gregory and reasoned
that as Michigan does not impose a duty upon manufacturers to
remedy defects after sale, it follows that the manufacturer should
have no duty to inform consumers of new safety features for nondefective products.'52 The court concluded by observing that the
party in control of the product, not the manufacturer, was in the
best position to know of the advisability of incorporating any later153
developed safety features.
As discussed in the previous section, in McDanieE v. ~ i e f f e ,a, ' ~ ~
federal trial court, applying Minnesota law, held that Minnesota
would recognize a post-sale duty to warn in the context of a laterdiscovered latent defect in a mass-produced product, in that
instance a motorcycle helmet, only upon a demonstration that the
harm that could be suffered was grave, and that there were present
other "special circumstances" identified by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in an earlier holding. Plaintiffs in that suit also opposed
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the count of
plaintiffs' complaint alleging that the manufacturer had breached a
post-sale duty to recall the product.
In contrast to its denial of summary judgment on plaintiffs
post-sale warnings count, the trial court granted defendant
summary judgment on the recall count, stating: 'While no
Minnesota court has addressed this issue directly, this Court is
convinced that Minnesota would refuse to impose a duty on
manufacturers to recall and/or retrofit a defective product because
the overwhelming minority of other jurisdictions have rejected
such an ~bli~ation."'~'
To similar effect is the decision of the Third
150. 528 N.W.2d 787 (1995) (injury sustained in operation of press brake).
151. Id. at 788.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 790.
154. 35 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D. Minn. 1999).
155. Id. at 743, and summarizing this authority: Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co.,
944 P.2d 1279, 12981300 (Haw. 1997)(collecting authority and stating that
"virtually every court that has confronted the issue head-on" has rejected this
duty); Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497,508 n.16 (8th Cir. 1993) (no duty under
Iowa law), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 (1994); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers
Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's
conclusion that Missouri does not recognize a duty to retrofit); Gregory v.
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Habecher v. Copperloy, ~ 0 r p . I ~ ~
That a manufacturer has no general duty to redesign a
product was reiterated in the Third Circuit opinion of LeJeune v.
157
Bliss-Salem, Inc., a claim arising from injuries suffered by a worker
in the course of operating a steel mill's transport line. Plaintiff
alleged that the supplier of the mill's electrical drive and control
system, and the general contractor, had a duty to redesign the line
in the course of their work in furtherance of reopening the mill.
Defendants countered that the contracts governing the work
"simply required them to put the mill machinery back into working
order and that any duty on their part did not extend to
reevaluating the safety aspects of the various machinery i n v ~ l v e d . " ' ~ ~
Affirming summaryjudgment, the appeals court wrote: "Due to the
limited nature of the contractual undertaking in this case, no duty
in tort arose on the part of [a]ppellees to redesi n safety features of
E9
the equipment or to warn of potential hazards."
A special relationship between the seller and the buyer may, in
limited circumstances, be interpreted as triggering a duty to recall
or repair. A leading decision supporting this proposition is Bell
' ~which the defendant manufactured and
Helicopter v. ~ r a h h a w ,in
sold a helicopter with rotor blades that were, at the time of the
1961 sale, state of the art. In 1968, the defendant undertook the
safety measure of updating the blades. Following a 1975 accident,
the court found that the manufacturer's conduct in replacing the
blades had created a post-sale duty to remediate unreasonable
product risks. In the court's words:
Where the record reflects, as in this case, an apparent
assumption of such a duty by a manufacturer, it is not
wholly improper for us to measure its conduct against
such a duty with respect to plaintiffs allegations of postmanufacture negligence. Here, the defendant assumed
the duty to improve the safety of its helicopter by
replacing the 102 system with the 117 system. Once the
duty was assumed, the defendant had an obligation to
complete the remedy by using reasonable means available
to it to cause replacement of the 102 systems with 117
Cincinnati, 538 N.W.2d 325,334 (Mich. 1995) (no continuing duty to recall).
156. 893 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law).
157. 85 F.3d 1069 (3d. Cir. 1996) (applying Delaware law).
158. Id. at 1071.
159. Id. at 1074.
160. 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
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161

systems.

IV. STATUTORY
RECALL,
REPAIR,REPORTING
ORREFUND
OBLIGATIONS UNDER
CONSUMER
PRODUCT
SAFETYACTSECTION
15
The first sections to this article discuss a seller's limited postsale duties to warn regarding a product's unreasonably dangerous
condition, and in even more limited settings, a post-sale duty to
recall or repair.
This section describes federal post-sale
informational or remedial obligations to which a manufacturer may
be subject, and specifically, recall, repair, or refund obligations
under the Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA).I6' Consumer
Product Safety Act section 15 requires firms to report to the
Commission whenever a product is or even might create a
"substantial product hazard," and gives the Commission broad
163
powers to command product recalls under certain circumstances.
Both recall and reporting requirements are keyed to the
phrase "substantial product hazard." A recall can be required when
a product is found "actually" to constitute a substantial product
hazard, but a report to the Commission is also required when a
product "could" be a substantial product hazard. Specifically,
CPSA section 15 requires a subject firm to notify the Commission
that its product: (1) does not comply with an applicable consumer
product safety rule, or (2) contains a "defect" which could create a
"substantial risk of injury to the public" and therefore presents a
substantial product hazard.164 When either the failure to comply
161. Id. at 532.
162. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.55 2051-2084 (1994)).
163. Id.
164. 15 U.S.C.A. section 2064(a) (1998) defines "substantial product hazard"
as:
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule
which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number
of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or
otherwise) creates substantial risk of injury to the public.
Section 2064(b) describes action to be taken upon discovery of potentially unsafe
products:
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and
every distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information
which reasonably supports the conclusion that such product: (1) fails to
comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule or with a
voluntary consumer product safety standard upon which the Commission
has relied under [15 U.S.C.A.5 20581 of this title; or (2) contains a defect
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with the rule or the actual defect creates a substantial risk of injury
to the public and therefore constitutes a substantial product
hazard, CPSA section 15 further authorizes the Commission, after a
hearing, to order a firm to provide notice of any such hazard to the
public, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and purchasers
(including consumers), and further to order replacement, repair,
or refund of the purchase price, less a reasonable allowance for
use. In addition to providing for voluntary remedial action,
including "corrective action plans" and consent agreements, CPSA
section 15 gives the Commission authority to seek injunctive relief
to prevent further distribution of an allegedly dangerous product.
Failure to furnish information required by CPSA section 15(b)
is prohibited under section 19(a)(4) of the Act, and a knowing
violation of CPSA section 19(a)(4) may subject the violator to civil
165
penalties. A separate violation can be found with respect to each
consumer product involved. A knowing violation of CPSA section
19 following a Commission Notice of Noncompliance can subject
the violator to criminal penalties under CPSA section 2 1 . ' ~ ~NO
private cause of action accrues against the manufacturer or seller

which could create a substantial product hazard described in subsection
(a)(2) of this section; or (3) creates an unreasonable risk of serious
injury or death, shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure
to comply, of such defect, or of such risk, unless such manufacturer,
distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge that the Commission has
been adequately informed of such defect, failure to comply, o r such risk.
Id. at § 2064(b).
165. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2068, provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to: (1) manufacture for sale, offer
for sale, distribute in commerce, or import into the United States any
consumer product which is not in conformity with an applicable
consumer product safety standard under this chapter; (2) manufacture
for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce, o r import into the United
States any consumer product which has been declared a banned
hazardous product by a rule under this chapter; (3) fail o r refuse to
permit access to o r copying of records, o r fail or refuse to establish o r
maintain records, o r fail or refuse to make reports o r provide
information, o r fail o r refuse to permit entry or inspection, as required
under this Act o r rule thereunder; (4) fail to furnish information
required by section 2064(b); (5) fail to comply with an order issued
(relating to notification, and to repair, replacement, and refund, and to
prohibited acts).
166. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2070(a) (1998), provides that "(a) Any person who
knowingly and willfully violates § 2068 of this Act after having received notice of
noncompliance from the Commission shall be fined not more than $50,000 or be
imprisoned not more than one year, o r both."
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for failure to n o w the Commission in a timely manner.
The first prong of the definition of "substantial product
hazard" sets up an automatic reporting requirement: if the product
fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule, it
must be reported whether or not the non-compliance is likely to
cause injury. A consumer product safety rule is defined to include
"a consumer product safety standard described in [16 U.S.C. §
20561, or a rule under this cha ter declaring a consumer product a
banned hazardous product." GB Thus, standards such as the
architectural glass standardI6' and bans such as that governing some
refuse bins170 are both included under the rubric of a consumer
product safety standard or rule.
Because of the limited number of product safety standards and
product bans, Commission enforcement of CPSA section 15 has
focused primarily on the provisions of section 15(b) (2).I7' Section
15(b) (2) requires a report when a product "contains a defect which
could create a substantial product hazard" as described in section
15(a). Section 15(a) defines a substantial product hazard as:
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer
product safety rule which creates a substantial risk of
injury to the public, or
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of
defect, the number of defective products distributed in
commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a
172
substantial risk of injury to the public.
Under sections 15(a) (2) and 15(b) (2), therefore, two
principal questions must be resolved in determining whether a
particular product could create a substantial product hazard: First,
is there a product "defect"? Second, if so, does this defect create a
substantial risk of injury to the public because of the pattern of the
defect, the number of defective products distributed in commerce,
the severity of the risk, or otherwise? Both of these questions will
be treated in order, followed by a discussion of various other
questions raised by the statute and implementing regulations, such

P

167. E.g., Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 898 F.2d 1452, 1457 (10th
Cir.1990) (survivors of six-year-old girl killed in ATV accident had no private cause
of action under CPSA for alleged manufacturer'sfailure to report).
168. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052 (1998).
169. 16 C.F.R. 5 1201 (2000).
170. Id. at 5 1301.
171. CSPAsection 15(b);15U.S.C.A.§2064(b).
172. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(b) ( I ) , (2) (1998).
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as who must make a report, and what information must be
reported.
Absent an applicable consumer product safety rule, the first
question to be resolved in deciding whether a section 15 report is
needed is whether the product contains a "defect."
The
Commission's section 15 rules do not attempt to define "defect,"'73
but opt for a brief interpretation accompanied by illustrative
examples.
The section describes defect as including, at a
minimum, the commonly accepted dictionary meaning of the
word. In general terms, the rules continue, a defect is a "fault, flaw,
or irregulari that causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy in form
or function."
The rules set out several representative illustrations of product
defects: (1) manufacturing or production defects, such as an
electric-appliance casing that can, through manufacturing error, be
electrically charged by full-line voltage; (2) labeling and marketing
defects"' such as athletic shoes advertised for, but unsuited to,

3r

l4

173. In preparing the final regulations the Commission was persuaded by the
concern of many commentators that a comprehensive Commission definition of
"defect" would be applied by courts in civil products liability disputes, possibly
increasing the financial exposure of subject firms. The Commission accordingly
included the following language in the final version of the regulation: "Defect, as
discussed in this section and used by the Commission and staff, pertains only to
interpreting and enforcing the Consumer Product Safety Act. The criteria and
discussion in this section are not intended to apply to any other areas of law." 16
C.F.R. 5 1115.4 (1980) (2000).
174. Id. The section continues:
A defect, for example, may be the result of a manufacturing or
production error, that is, the consumer product as manufactured is not
in the form intended by, or fails to perform in accordance with, its
design. In addition, the design of and the materials used in a consumer
product may also result in a defect. Thus, a product may contain a defect
even if the product is manufactured exactly in accordance with its design
and specifications, if the design presents a risk of injury to the public. A
design defect may also be present if the risk of injuly occurs as a result of
the operation or use of the product or the failure of the product to
operate as intended. A defect can also occur in a product's contents,
construction, finish, packaging, warnings, and/or instructions. With
respect to instructions, a consumer product may contain a defect if the
instructions for assembly or use could allow the product, otherwise safely
designed and manufactured, to present a risk of injury.
Id.
175. The term "marketing" is the Commission's. While the CPSA does not vest
the Commission with authority to impose "marketing" requirements as such, it
does, in CPSA section 7(a)(2)(B), authorize Commission promulgation of
standards which may include "[rlequirements that a consumer product be marked
with or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or
~

~
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running and that cause muscle or tendon injury; (3) defects due to
inadequate warnings and instructions, such as a power tool without
adequate instructions or safety warnings, even in the absence of
reported injuries, where foreseeable use or misuse could result in
injury based in part on such informational inadequacies; and (4)
defects due to consumer reliance and product non-performance,
such as a garage
- exhaust fan advertised to activate when fumes
reach a dangerous level, but that fails, for whatever reason, to do
176
SO.
In addition to describing manufacturing, design, labeling
(including warning labels), and marketing defects, the
Commission's discussion of defects implies a balancing test of utility
and risk, using the example of a metalicized kite and an ordinary
kitchen knife to illustrate the risk/utility evaluation. According to
the Commission, while the foil finish of a metalicized kite may be
attractive, and the kite may fly better for its added weight, because
the kite can conduct electricity from air to ground and can
foreseeably become tangled with power lines, it is defective within
the meaning of section 15(a), even if designed, manufactured, and
marketed as intended.17'
Consumer Product Safety Act section 15 applies to all
"consumer
Section 15(b) imposes reporting
requirements upon "[elvery manufacturer of a consumer product
distributed in commerce, and every distributor and retailer of such
product." Importers are included in the section 3(a) (4) definition
of 1tman~fact~rer~.11179
Firms which have received reportable information must file an
Initial ~ e ~ o r tManufacturers
.'~~
and importers must also file a
subsequent Full ~ e ~ 0 r t . Distributors
I~'
or retailers who are neither
manufacturers nor importers of the products in question are
requirements respecting the form of warnings or instructions." 15 U.S.C.A. 3
2056(a) (2) (1998).
176. 1 6 C . F . R . § 1 1 1 5 . 4 ( a ) ( b ) ( d ) & ( e ) .
177. Id. at fj 1115.4(c).
178. Consumer products are defined by the Act to include: "[Alny article, or
component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for
use in or around a permanent or temporaIy household or residence, a school, in
recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment
of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a
school, in recreation, or otherwise. . . ." CPSA § 3(a) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a) (1).
179. 15 U.S.C.A. 5 2052(a),(4) (1976).
180. 16 C.F.R. at § 1115.13(c).
181. Id. at 5 1115.13(d).
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subject to the reporting requirements of section 15(b) but can
satisfy their notification obligations by complying with the less
comprehensive reporting requirements of an Initial ~ e ~ o r t . ' ' ~
Additionally, reporting is required of a firm when it has obtained
information which reasonably supports the conclusion that a
product fails to comply with a voluntary consumer product safety
standard upon which the Commission has relied under section 9 of
the CPSA, or creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or
death. A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer is not relieved of
this obligation unless it has actual knowledge that the Commission
has already been adequately i n f ~ r m e d . " ~
Reporting obligations under section 15(b) are triggered by
product noncompliance or by the existence of a substantial
product hazard in any consumer product "distributed in
commerce." Section 3(a) (11) of the Act states that " [t]he terms 'to
distribute in commerce' and 'distribution in commerce' means to
sell in commerce, to introduce or deliver for introduction into
commerce, or to hold for sale or distribution after introduction
into ~ornrnerce."~'~
A firm must immediately, i.e., within twenty-four hours, report
information which reasonably supports the conclusion that a
substantial product hazard may exist.''' In recognition of variable
weight that is properly attached to different types of product safety
related information, the rules set out certain information which, in
the Commission's view, reasonably supports the conclusion that a
186
report is necessary. Other categories of information which are of
uncertain substantiality must nevertheless be probed to determine
if they "reasonably support the conclusion" that a substantial
product hazard may exist.'''
A subject firm must immediately
report information which indicates "that a noncompliance or a
182. Id. at 5 1115.13(b).
183. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 1990 ("Improvement
Act" ), Pub. L. 101-608, § 1, 104 Stat. 3110, amended section 15(b) of the CPSA,
broadening its triggering mechanisms with the inclusion of the two provisions
above. Prior to the 1990 Amendments, reporting noncompliance or risk of
serious injury or death was not required unless the noncompliance o r risk created
a product defect which could create a substantial product hazard as described in
CPSA subsection 15(a)(2).
184. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a) (11).
185. CPSAS 15(b), 15 U.S.C.A. 5 2064(b); 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(e).
186. Examples of the kind of information required are set out in 16 C.F.R. §
1115.12(a).
187. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1115.12(a)-1115.12(e) (1980).
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defect in a consumer product has caused, may have caused, or
contributed to the causing, or could cause or contribute to the
causing of a death or grievous bodily injury. . . unless the firm has
"investigated and determined that the information is not
The reporting requirements attached to the risk of serious
injury or death from a product are preventative by design. The fact
that, absent an actual serious injury or death, no final
determination as to the existence of such risks may be possible has
no bearing on a firm's obligation to evaluate whatever information
is available to it in terms of whether it reasonably supports a finding
that the risks do exist.lsg The standard regarding a potential
obligation to report risk of serious injury or death is this: could a
reasonable person conclude, given the information available, that a
product creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death. In
making such a determination, a firm is permitted to balance a
series of risk-utility factors,
as well as to determine the
reasonableness of a conclusion that a product violates a standard or
ban promulgated under the FHSA, FFA, PPPA or RSA, to the
extent that it could result in a serious injury or death.Ig0
Even in the absence of a death or grievous bodily injury, the
rules state that "other information may indicate a reportable defect
or noncompliance," and that the subject firm may be held
responsible for knowledge which could be derived by a "reasonable
and prudent manufa~turer."'~' The regulations offer specific
illustrations of the types of information a firm should consider in
deciding whether or not to report. These include information
188. Id. at § 1115.12(c). The regulations set out the following examples of
grievous bodily injury: "[Mlutilation, amputation/dismemberment, disfigurement,
loss of important bodily functions, debilitating internal disorders, severe bums,
severe electrical shocks, and injuries likely to require extended hospitalization."
Id.
189. 16 C.F.R. 8 1115.6(a).
190. Id. at § (b).
191. "In evaluating whether or when a subject firm should have reported, the
Commission will deem a subject firm to know what a reasonable and prudent
manufacturer (including an importer) distributor, o r retailer would know." 16
C.F.R. § 1115.12(e). In addition, the fact that a product fails to comply with a
standard must immediately be reported to the CPSC under § 15(b), pursuant to
the guidance of 16 C.F.R. § 1115.2(b), "unless the manufacturer (including an
importer), distributor or retailer has actual knowledge that the Commission has
been adequately informed of such failure to comply, defect, o r risk. This
provision indicates that a broad spectrum of safety related information should be
reported under section 15(b) of the CPSA."
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concerning:
[El ngineering,
quality
control,
or
production
data.. .safety-related production or design change(s)...
[p]roduct liability suits.. .independent testing laboratory
[results] ...[c]omplaints from a consumer or consumer
group.. .[i]nformation received from the Commission or
other governmental agency.. . [or] [i]nformation received
from other firms, including requests to return a product
or for replacement or credit.lg2
The last-described category, the regulations provide, "includes both
requests made by distributors and retailers to the manufacturer and
requests from the manufacturer that products be ret~rned."'~'
Unless the information is clearly reportable, the firm can
spend a reasonable time, not to exceed ten days, for investigation
194
and evaluation. Recognizing that reportable information may be
sketchy or unconfirmed, and to encourage the earliest possible
reporting, the regulations state in its report to the CPSA "[a]
subject firm . . . need not admit, or may specifically deny, that the
information it submits reasonably supports the conclusion that its
consumer product is non-complying, contains a defect that could
create a substantial product hazard within the meaning of [CPSA
section 15(b)], or creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or
death.ltlg5
Initial reports must be filed immediately, that is, within 24
196
hours, after a subject firm has obtained information which
reasonably supports the conclusion" that a product "fails to comply
with an applicable consumer product safety rule or voluntary
consumer product safety standard, contains a defect which could
create a substantial risk of injury to the public, or creates an
unreasonable risk of serious injury or death."lg7 Initial reports
which are not in writing must be confirmed in writing within
forty-eight hours of the non-written report.Ig8
192. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(f).
193. Id. at § 115.12(f)(7)
194. 16 C.F.R. 5 1115.14(d).
195. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(a).
196. Weekends and holidays are excluded from these calculations. Id. at §
1115.14(a).
197. Id. at § 1115.14(e).
198. Id. at § 1115.13(c). The earlier rules required a covered firm to make an
initial notification to the Commission within 24 hours of receiving information
which reasonably supported the conclusion that there was a substantial product
hazard. Id. § 1115.14(e). The initial notification would identify the product in
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Where the subject firm learns of a death, grievous bodily
injury, or other possibly reportable information, the regulations
state that the firm must investigate and evaluate the information
within ten days unless the firm "can demonstrate that a longer
period is r e a s ~ n a b l e . " 'The
~ ~ Commission deems that "at the end of
ten days, a subject firm has received and considered all information
which would have been available to it had a reasonable,
expeditious, and diligent investigation been undertaken. "200 When
a subject firm has not notified the Commission in a timely fashion
within the meaning of section 15 and the regulations, the
Commission may seek assessment of civil penalties under section
20.
A firm is not required to file a section 15(b) report if it
possesses "actual knowledge that the Commission has been
adequately informed of such defect, failure to comply, or such
risk."201 The Commission is adequately informed when "the
Commission staff has received the information (provided in Initial
Reports and Final Reports) *** insofar as it is reasonably available
and applicable[, or] the st& has informed the subject firm that the
staff is adequately informed."202

Part 6 of UCC Article 2 pertains to breach, repudiation and
excuse under the UCC sales provisions, and provides special buyer
remedies where the buyer receives one or more products that are
non-conforming. As defective products not duly safe for their
intended use have been considered "not for their ordinary
purpose" within the meaning of UCC § 2-314(c), so too the Code
provisions
governing "non-conforming" goods have been
interpreted as including within their compass products that create
an unreasonable risk of injury to persons or property.
In a single delivery contract, upon the seller's tender of the
defective product, the buyer may reject the product if it "fail[s] in
any respect to conform to the contract."203 Whene the contract
-

question, describe the course of distribution, and "[slpecify the nature and extent
of the defect or failure to comply." Id. §§ 1115.5(a) - 1115.5(e).
199. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(d).
200. Id.
201. CPSA § 15(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064 (1998).
202. C.F.R. § 1115.3(a).
203. U.C.C. § 2-601. Official Comment 2 thereto states in part: "[Tlhe buyer's
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between the buyer and the seller is one providing for delivery of
more than one commercial unit, the buyer may accept one or more
of the units and reject the remainder.204
Where the contract between the buyer and seller is one
providing for satisfaction by installment, the buyer may reject an
installment only where the defect "substantially impairs the value of
,,205
the installment and cannot be cured. ...
Whether the nature of
the defect, its scope, or both constitute a substantial impairment of
the contract is a very fact-specific question. For example, in
206
Continental F m t Products, Inc. v. White Lumber Sales, Inc., in which
the installment contract called for rejection of goods revealing
more than 5% deviation from the terms of the contract, and the
seller's first carload showed 9% deviation, while the second had less
than 596, the court held that the seller's non-conformity was a
minor deviation not amounting to a substantial impairment.
The buyer's remedy of rejection must be exercised within a
reasonable time after delivery of the goods, and will be ineffective
unless the buyer "seasonably" notifies the seller of the rejection.'07
The notification must iden*
the product inadequacies with
particularity.208What constitutes a reasonable time is ordinarily a
question of facto9 and will be affected by the nature of the
It has been held that a buyer makes a timely rejection
attempts in good faith to dispose of defective goods where the seller has failed to
give instructions within a reasonable time are not to be regarded as an
acceptance." Id. See generally discussion of these warranty remedies in Alperin &
Chase, Consumer Law, Sales Practices and Credit Regulation 5 251 e t seq.
204. U.C.C. § 2-601 (c).
205. U.C.C. § 2-612(2). Subsection (3) to U.C.C. § 2-612 states in pertinent
part: "Whenever nonconformity or default with respect to one o r more
installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach
of the whole."
206. 474 P.2d 1 (Or. 1970).
207. U.C.C. § 2-602; see generally Knic Knac Agencies v. Masterpiece Apparel,
Ltd., No. 94 CIV. 1073(LMM), 1999 WL 156379, at "7 (S.D.N.Y. March 22, 1999)
(rejection seasonably made as recipient did not particularize defects).
208. Id; see also U.C.C. § 2-605 (stating "[tlhe buyer's failure to state in
connection with rejection a particular defect that is ascertainable by reasonable
inspection precludes him from relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection
or to establish breach . . . (a)where the seller could have cured it if stated
seasonably").
209. Buckeye Trophy, Inc. v. S. Bowling & Billiard Supply Co., 443 N.E.2d
1043,1046 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (finding the passage of 65 days does not, by itself,
establish that rejection thereafter was not within reasonable time); U.C.C. 5 1204(2) (stating "what is a reasonable time for taking any action depends upon the
nature, purpose and circumstances of such action.").
210. See generally 4 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-602:17. E.g.,
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of goods where the rejection is made within twenty-four hours of
tender,"' or within one week."' Even a delay of two months has
been held to present a jury issue as to timeliness when the
nonconformity or defect was not patent and the product was
shipped una~sembled.~'~
The UCC also sets forth the means by which the seller, in
certain circumstances, may "cure" its delivery of a defective
product. The seller's "cure" must be in accordance with UCC
section 2-508, which provides that upon delivery of a product that is
defective or otherwise non-conforming, and whene the time for
compliance with the terms of the contract of sale has not expired,
the seller "may reasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure
and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.

...

,214

Lastly, the buyer in receipt of a defective product may revoke
acceptance of the
A valid "revocation of acceptance" vests
in the buyer "the same rights and duties with regards to the duties

Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968),
531 F.Supp.
1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (time for rejecting live animal shorter than that for
inanimate object).
211. Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455, 459 (M.D .Pa.1972).
212. Glen O'Brien Moveable Partition Co., Inc. v. McMullen, 608 S.W.2d 512,
520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
213. Sherkate Sahami Khass Rapol (Rapol Contr. Co.) v. Henry R. Jahn & Son,
Inc., 701 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1983).
214. U.C.C. 5 2-508(1); see also RAY D. HENSON,
THELAW OF SALES§ 4.02 at 12528 (1985); ROBERT
J. NORDSTROM,
HANDBOOK
OF THELAWOF SALES
5 105 at 317-22
(1970).
215. For example, Maryland Commercial Code Article 6 5 2-608 provides:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot o r commercial unit
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if h e as
accepted it:
(a) O n the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured
and it has not been seasonablv cured: or
(b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance
o r by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after
the buyer discovers o r should have discovered the ground for it and
before any substantial change in the condition of the goods which is not
caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the
seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to
the goods involved as if h e had rejected them.
See also discussion in Hardy v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 706 A.2d 1086, 1091-92
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
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involved as if he had rejected them [;I"'I6 thus, in effect, reinstating
the seller as the owner of the chattel. A breach of warranty may
establish a nonconformity sufficient to trigger the buyer's right to
217
revoke acceptance.
The revocation of acceptance remedy
remains, however, conceptually distinct from that of a claim for
breach of warranty,'I8 and a jury instruction that "intertwine[s]"
the warranty remedy and the revocation of acceptance remedy
constitutes reversible error.219
Unlike rejection, which the UCC provides as a remedy for
ordinary non-conformity of the goods, revocation of acceptance
may only be had where the non-conformity or defective nature of
the goods "substantially impairs its value" to the buyer."0 In
addition to requiring a showing of substantial impairment, the
revocation of acceptance remedy differs from the antecedent right
to reject the goods in these respects: the buyer (1) in accepting
initially, (a) must, if the defect had already been discovered, have
proceeded on the reasonable assumption that the seller would
cure; or (b) if the defect had not been discovered, must have been
induced to the acceptance by the difficulty in ascertainment of the
defect or by the conduct of the seller; (2) must revoke acceptance
within a reasonable time; and (3) must revoke before a substantial
216. Id. at 1091.
217. Campbell Farms v. Wald, 578 N.W.2d 96,99 (N.D. 1998). Campbell Farms
was a suit brought by bull buyers for damages and return of the purchase price of
a bull whose reproductive capacity, the buyers claimed, fell short of a sales
brochure's representation of the animal as an "active breeder. . . ." Id.
218. Murray v. D & J Motor Co. Inc., 958 P.2d 823, 828 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998)
("The right t6 revokedoes not depend upon the existence or breach of any
warranty. The buyer may revoke. . . even though all warranties are excluded. . . .
") (quoting Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc. 638 P.2d 210 (1981));
Breitung v. Canzano, 660 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (involving
claimed breach of warranty of title and buyer's endeavor to revoke acceptance of
an automobile, with court commenting that breach of warranty and revocation of
acceptance "constitute separate causes of action, have independent notice and
procedure requirements, and if successful, result in different remedies.").
219. Breitung. v. Canzano, 660 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (claim
alleging false representation of vehicle mileage and vehicle registration number).
220. U.C.C. § 2-608; Campbell v. Pollack, 221 A.2d 615, 619 (R.I. 1966)
(discussing the meaning of substantial impairment); see also Conte v. Dwan
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 148 (Conn. 1976) (noting that revocation is
possible when the impairment substantially reduces value of a good); Durfee v.
Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 35455 (Minn. 1977) (revocation is
acceptable if seller does not correct impairment within a "reasonable time");
Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 186 S.E.2d 161 (N.C. 1972), appeal after
remand, 201 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); Lee R. Russ, Annotation, What
Constitutes "Substantial Impairment ", 38 A.L.R.~TH191 (1996).
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change not related to the defect occurs in the goods.221Issues of
non-conformity with contract, substantial impairment, and
timeliness of notice to the seller are ordinarily questions of fact.222

VI. AUTOMOBILE
LEMONLAWS
Prior to the widespread adoption of lemon lawszz3courts in
many jurisdictions demonstrated a solicitude towards the claims of
purchasers whose vehicles, most frequently automobiles, were
discovered to have a material and incurable defect.224In so doing,
some decisions seemingly stretched into unrecognizability the UCC
section 2-608(2) requirement that revocation be within a
"reasonable time."225Another means by which courts favored the
automobile owner whose warranty limited the remedy to repair and
replacement of any inoperable parts was to examine the
221. E.g., The Inn Between, Inc. v. Remanco Metro., Inc., 662 N.Y.S.2d 1011
(N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1997). Inn Between involved the buyer's suit to revoke acceptance of
a used restaurant computer system. The court held that the facts established that
the product had sufficient nonconformities to justify remedy of revocation; that
such nonconformities substantially impaired product's value; that seller failed to
seasonably cure the nonconformities; and that the buyer revoked acceptance
within a reasonable time. Id. at 101314.
222. E.g., Murray v. D & J Motor Co., Inc., 958 P.2d 823, 826 (Okla. Ct. App.
1998); see also Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 480 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Ark. 1972) ("What
constitutes a nonconforming delivery, acceptance, rejection, o r revocation of
acceptance are questions of fact. . . ."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Caizzo, 564 A.2d
931,936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (stating that determining what is a reasonable time
for rejection of goods after delivery is generally a question of fact).
223. See generally Comment, Sweetening the Fate of the "Lemon"Owner: California
and Connecticut Pass Legislation Dealing With Defective New Cars, 14 U. TOL. L. REV.
341 (1983). See also HOWARD
J . ALPERIN
& ROLAND
F. CHASE,CONSUMER
LAW:SALES
P R A ~ I C AND
E S CREDIT
REGULATION
§ 218 (1986).
224. WEBSTER'STHIRDNEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY
1293 (1993), defines
"lemon" as "something o r someone that proves to be unsatisfactory o r undesirable:
[synonymous with] dud, failure.. ."
225. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 224 So. 2d 638,647 (Ala. 1969) ("Repeated
attempts at adjustments having failed, we hold the buyer McMurtry revoked his
acceptance of the automobile within a reasonable time."); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Earnest, 184 So. 2d 811, 814 (Ala. 1966) ("We can agree with the appellee's
contention that at some point after the purchase of a new automobile, the same
should be put in good running condition .... This is no more than saying that at
some point in time, it must become obvious to all people that a particular vehicle
simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that the same is made free from
defect."); Conte v. Dawn Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 149 (Conn. 1976)
("Under the circumstances of this case, involving an almost continuous [fourteenmonth] series of negotiations and repairs, the delay in the notice [to revoke] did
not prejudice the dealer and was not unreasonable."); see also Douglas L. Elden,
Revocation ofAcceptance: Interpetation and Application, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 14 (1975).

Heinonline - - 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 78 2000-2001

20001

MODERN POST-SALE WARNINGS

79

enforcement of such a limitation in the context of the product's
overall failure. The warrantor's provision of the exclusive remedy
of repair or replacement was often understood to "give the seller
an opportunity to make the goods conforming while limiting the
risks to which he is subject by excluding direct and consequential
damages that might otherwise arise."226Courts favoring the equities
of the buyer's position frequently concluded that where the
warrantor failed to correct the defect as promised within a
reasonable time, he should be liable for breach of that warrar~ty,'~'
or that and the limited, purportedly exclusive remedy of the seller
failed of its essential purpose and was therefor avoidable under
UCC section 2-719.'"
Illustrative on this oint is the South Dakota decision in
B~ ~action brought by the purchaser of a
Johnson v. John Deere C O . an
tractor which was built with the wrong sized bolts on the front
wheels, and which suffered from oil leaks, transmission problems,
internal engine malfunctions, and miscellaneous problems with
water hoses, the fuel injection system, and the injector pump
shaft.230The trial court declined to identify any limitation upon the
period of time within which the seller could successfully perform its
226. Beal v. Gen. Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423,426 (D. Del. 1973).
227. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150 (Ca1.1965);Steele v. J.I. Case
Co., 419 P.2d 902, 908 (Kan. 1966).
228. Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39,43-44 (N.D.
Ill. 1970):
Although the plaintiff-buyer purchased and accepted the machinery and
equipment with the apparent knowledge that the seller had limited its
liability to repair or replacement, and although the plaintiff does not
allege any form of unconscionability in the transactions which led to the
purchase, plaintiff also was entitled to assume that defendants would not
be unreasonable or wilfully dilatory in making good their warranty in the
event of defects in the machinery and equipment. It is the specific
breach of the warranty to repair that plaintiff alleges caused the bulk of
its damages. This Court would be in an untenable position if it allowed
the defendant to shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty when
it has allegedly repudiated and ignored its very limited obligations under
another segment of the same warranty, which alleged repudiation has
caused the very need for relief which the defendant is attempting to
avoid. If the plaintiff is capable of sustaining its burden of proof as to the
allegations it has made, the defendant will be deemed to have repudiated
the warranty agreement so far as restricting plaintiffs warranties, and the
exclusive remedy provision of the contract will be deemed under the
circumstances to have failed of its essential purpose, thus allowing
plaintiff the general array of remedies under the Code.
229. 306 N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981).
230. Id. at 234.
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duties under the warranty's exclusive repair and replacement
remedy, adding: "Now, you know the law won't protect you from a
lemon, we know that. They will protect you from a breach of
warranty. [Alnd I think under the state of this record that there
' [has been]
no unreasonable delay" in effectuating successful
231
repairs.
In its review of the decisions below, the South Dakota Supreme
Court examined the official notes to the UCC, as well as decisional
law suggesting that the existence of the repair and replacement
remedy was no license for the seller to make a career of
unsuccessful efforts to make plaintiffs car operational.292
Reversing
and remanding for trial the issue of whether unreasonable delay
made the seller's warranty fail of its essential purpose, the state high
court wrote: "After reviewing the record, we are inclined to agree
with the trial court's characterization of the tractor as a 'lemon,' but
we disagree that the law will not protect the purchaser of a lemon."
Interestingly, the court decided against the purchaser on the claim
that the exclusive remedy provision was unconscionable under
UCC section 2 - 3 0 2 . ~ ~ ~
231. Id. at 233.
232. Steek, 419 P.2d at 907 ("An unsuccessful effort to remedy the defect
renders the seller liable on his warranty; and the buyer is not bound to allow him a
second opportunity, or to permit him to tinker with the article indefinitely in the
hope that it may ultimately be made to comply with the warranty. . . . The vendor
does not have an unlimited time for performance of its obligation to replace.");
Beal, 354 F. Supp. at 427 n. 2 ("The limited remedy fails of its essential purpose
whenever the seller fails to repair the goods within a reasonable time; good faith
attempts to repair might be relevant to the issue of what constitutes a reasonable
time.").
233. .,rohnson. 306 N.W.2d at 238. The court stated:
The record clearly supports appellant's argument as to buyer's
background, experience, and business acumen. More importantly, it
supports their assertion that buyer had examined the New Equipment
Warranty and was fully aware and willing to trade off the remedy for
consequential loss for the warranty of replacement and repair. At trial
appellant testified that when he purchased the tractor he realized that
under the warranty, repairs would be made for most things within a given
period of time, but that he was more interested in the service that he
would receive once he had purchased the tractor. Thus, although the
repair and replacement warranty may have subsequently failed of its
essential purpose, thereby entitling him to general damages for breach of
contract as outlined in the code, the limitation on remedy was not
unconscionable at the time the contract was made, either procedurally or
substantively, and he would not be entitled to recover consequential
damages.
Id.; see generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New
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While the commercial code of most states restricts the seller's
ability to limit or exclude the implied warranty of
mer~hantability,~"
an increasing number of others, in conjunction
with or independent of that particular warranty reform, have
passed so-called lemon laws to provide an expedited and
intelligible remedy for the purchaser of an unmerchantable
automobile, the problems with which the dealer and the
manufacturer are unable to correct within a reasonable time.
Ordinarily, remedies under such laws are predicated upon a
showing that the defect or defects "substantially impair" the
function, safety or value of the vehicle.235Lemon laws are perhaps
unique among consumer protection and products liability laws in
their enjoyment of significant support from both consumers and
from product manufacturers and other sellers.236
Clause, 115 U . PA. L. REV.
485 (1967).
234. E.g., Kansas Consumer Protection Act, RS.A. 50-639:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law with respect to property
which is the subject of or is intended to become the subject of a
consumer transaction in this state, no supplier shall: (1) Exclude, modify,
or otherwise attempt to limit. . . the implied warranty of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose...or (2) exclude; modify, or attempt
to limit any remedy provided by law, including the measure of damages
available, for a breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose. ..(c) A supplier may limit the supplier's implied
warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose with
respect to a defect or defects in the property only if the supplier
established that the consumer had knowledge of the defect or defects,
which became the basis of the bargain between the parties ...(d) Nothing
in this section shall be construed to expand the implied warranty of
merchantability as defined in K.S.A. 842-314 ... to involve obligations in
excess of those which are appropriate to the property... (e) A disclaimer
or limitation in violation of this section is void. If a consumer prevails in
an action based upon a breach of warranty, and the supplier has violated
this section, the court may, in addition to any damages recovered, award
reasonable attorney's fees and a civil penalty under KS.A. 50-636, and
amendments thereto, or both to be paid by the supplier who gave the
improper disclaimer. (0 The makiniof a limited express warranty is not
in itself a violation of this section.
235. Jarvis v. Safari Motor Coaches, Inc., 670 N.Y.S.2d 927, 928-929 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) (showing of substantial impairment notwithstanding petitioner's ability
"to use the motor home for some purposes").
236. Note, L.B. 155: Nebraska's "LemonLaw": Synthesizing Remedies for the Owner
of a Lemon, 17 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 345, 346 11.13 (1984) (quoting debate on floor of
state legislature). In this article, one senator commented:
We, as franchised dealers, could not be advocating any more strongly the
consumer's position than in our presentation of this legislation. We
value our customers' reputations and we resent being placed in the
middleman position trying to attempt to help these- customers and
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A primary impetus for the promulgation of lemon laws was a
desire on the part of legislatures to simpllfj the automobile owner's
cause of action for recovery of economic loss due to a defective
a u t ~ m o b i l e , ~and
~ ' to permit owner recovery of direct economic
loss, including recovery for damage the defective condition caused
to the automobile itself.298In the words of the Supreme Court of
Vermont, a typical lemon law is passed "in order to facilitate an
expeditious and inexpensive resolution of automobile warranty
problems."2" Pennsylvania's lemon law, for example, provides that
the "manufacturer of a new vehicle sold in the Commonwealth
shall repair or correct, at no cost to the purchaser, a nonconformity
which substantially impairs the use, value or safety of said motor
vehicle which may occur within a period of one year following
actual delivery of the vehicle to the purchaser, within the first
12,000 miles of use or during the term of the warranty, whichever
may first
The lemon laws passed by many jurisdiction^^^'
enjoy marked similarities, with a large number modeled on the
Connecticut lemon
243
Most lemon law apply only to new vehicles. Moreover, most
ourselves resolve these problems. Everyone, the public, the dealers, the
manufacturers, should appreciate having clearcut and not arbitra~y
parameters in this matter within which we can still operate.
Id.
237. Hearings on House Bill 5729 Before Connecticut General Law Comm.
235 (March 11, 1982) ("[The bill would] release the consumer from the legal
burdens and difficulties that exist when one brings suit under our present law.")
(comments of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor).
238. ALPERIN& CHASE,supra note 227, at p.325 n.1 (noting that 33 states plus
the District of Columbia have lemon laws, and collecting law review commentary );
Note, Lemon Law: Putting the Squeeze on Automobib Manufacturers, 61 WASH.U . L.Q.
1125, 1149 n.125 (1984).
239. In re Vilhueve, 709 A.2d 1067, 1068 (Vt. 1998) (referencing 9 VT. STAT.
AYN.
§§ 4170-81.
240. 73 PA. CONST.
STAT.ANN.
§ 1954, analyzed in Pavese v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. CIV. A. 97-3688,1998 WL 57761 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
241. CAL. CN. CODE§ 1793.2 (1998); 6 DEL. CODE§§ 5001-5009; FLA. STAT.
ANN.§§ 681.10-681.108 (1990); 10 ME. REV. STAT.ANN.§§ 1161-1165 (1999); MASS.
GEN.LAwsANN.ch. 90, §§ 7N-7N 1/2 (2000); MINN.
STAT.ANN. 3 325F.665 (2000);
Mom. CODEANN. §§ 614501 to 614505 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT.5s 60-2702 to 602709 (1995); NEV.REV. STAT.§ 598 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. § 357-D (1995);
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-a; 1983 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 8, 176; TEX.CN. CODE
ANN.art. 4413(36) (2000); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. 2472; Wls. STAT.ANN.5 218.015
(1994); Wyo. STAT.Am. § 40-17-101 (1999).
GEN.STAT.ANN.§ 42-179 (2000).
242. CONN.
243. See generally Jarvis v. Safari Motor Coaches, Inc., 670 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (interpreting New York's General Business Law § 198-a, the state's
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lemon laws restrict their remedies to "consumers," which is to say,
Some lemon laws apply
purchasers of vehicles for personal use.244
only sales,245while others cover lease agreements.'46 or whatever
state-by-state distinctions may exist between lemon laws, several
elements are common to practically all. The lemon laws: (1) state
that their remedies are nonex~lusive;'~~ (2) extend the
manufacturer's repair obligations beyond the temporal limitations
in any express warranty when repair efforts during the warranty
period have failed;248(3) provide a purchaser remedy of refund or
replacement upon failure of a reasonable number of attempts to
repair, and speciEy the number of repair attempts that will be
considered rea~onable;"~(4) vest in the consumer a direct action
and ( 5 ) require the consumer to resort
against the manufa~turer;"~
first to a "qualified third-party dispute resolution process," or
25
arbitration.
Many lemon laws have been interpreted to create a
rebuttable presumption that four repair initiatives, or a designated
number of days out of commission, represent a reasonable
number of attempts to bring the vehicle into conformity with its
warranty.'"

"New Car Lemon Law."). E.g.,N.M. STAT.ANN. § 57-16A-2(C) (1995) (defining
consumer as a buyer of "a new motor vehicle" for purposes other than resale),
discussed in Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 953 P.2d 1104, 1107 (N.M. 1998). The
Jones court references approvingly Joseph Goldberg, New Mexico's "Lemon Law":
Consumer Protection or Consumer Frustration, 16 N.M. L. REV. 251,264 (1986) (" [TI he
law largely, though not exclusively, is confined to the sale of new vehicles for
personal (as opposed to business) use.").
244. E.g.,ALA. CODE§ 820A-l(1) (1999) (discussed in Lipham v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 665 So. 2d 190, 193 (Ala. 1995)); N.M. STAT.ANN.5 57-16A-2(C) (1995)
(defining consumer as "the purchaser, other than for purposes of resale, of a new
motor vehicle for personal, family or household purposes, any person to whom
such motor vehicle has been transferred during the duration of an express
warranty applicable to the motor vehicle and any other person entitle by the terms
of the warranty to enforce the terms of the warranty").
245. E.g.,Pavese v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CIV. A. 97-3688., 1998 WL 57761
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (interpreting 73 PA. CONST.STAT.ANN.§ 1954).
246. E.g.,TENN.COD.ANN. §§ 5524201, 55-24204 (1998); Mo. ANN. STAT.§
407.560. See other statutes collected at Pavese, 1998 WL 57761, at *3.
247. E.g., CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. 5 1.
248. Id. at § 1(d).
249. Id. at § 18 & subsection (d).
250. Id. at § 2.
251. E.g.,CAL. CML CODE§ 1793.2(e)(2) (1998); Ford Motor Co. v. Fowler,
705 So. 2d 662 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1998) (appeal of determination of Florida Motor
Vehicle Arbitration Board under auspices of that state's lemon law dispute
settlement procedure process).
252. CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. §§ 42-179("out of service by reason of repair for a
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A complainant must bring his claim, including any appeal of
the decision of an arbitration board, in a timely fashion.*j3
However, a manufacturer may waive any defense of untimeliness by
its voluntary participation in the dispute settlement process.254A
lemon law may permit the prevailing complainant reasonable
attorneys fees and
The goal of such a statute "is to make
the consumer whole, and to restore the consumer to a position he
or she occupied before acquiring the lemon."z56

cumulative total of thirty or more calendar days"). Compare with FLA.STAT.ANN.§
681.104(4) (2000) (fifteen working day and three repair attempt criteria); N.Y.
GEN.BUS. LAW § 198a(d)( fourth attempt and thirty day limit within two years of
purchase or 18,000 miles, whichever comes first).
253. E.g., FLA.STAT.ANN.§ 681.1095(10) (1990) (providing that appeal of
decision of Florida Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board must be filed within "30 days
after receipt of the decision"). A consumer "who pursues a case in front of the
arbitration panel must file a damage action within one year after the final action
of the [Bloard." Ford Motor Co. v. Fowler, 705 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1998).
254. E.g., Fowler, 705 So. 2d at 663.
255. Ledoux v. Ford Motor Co., No. 96-6981, 1998 WL 107112, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
1998) ("In determining appropriate attorney's fees, the court must first determine
the lodestar. The lodestar is a computation of a reasonable hourly rate multiplied
by the number of hours the court determines the attorney reasonably worked.
The court may then adjust the lodestar as the court deems appropriate.")
(citations omitted). E.g., Pugliese v. Chrysler Corp., 1998 WL 34857, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. 1998) (reasonable rates in jurisdiction ranging from $100 to $150 per hour);
Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.75(A), discussed in Fortner v. Ford Motor Co., 1998 WL
172862, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished opinion).
256. Fortner, 1998 WL 172862, at *l.
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